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1. INTRODUCTION
Unlike the normative practice in other modern nations,! the
general rule in the United States is that each party to a legal dispute
is responsible for payment of the attorney's fees which he incurs prior
to and during litigation, regardless of the ultimate disposition of the
dispute by the courts.2 "Costs" are typically awarded to a successful
litigant and taxed against the losing party,3 but statutory cost do not
usually include attorney's fees.4 The no-fee rule,5 which is generally
applicable in every American jurisdiction except one,' has long in-
' The United States "now is probably alone in failing to allow counsel fees to the victorious
litigant." Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 792, 797 (1966). However, there is not uniformity among nations with respect to proce-
dure for award of attorney's fees. Id. at 797-98. For discussions of the methods by which several
countries provide for defrayal of victors' legal expenses, see 1962 PROCEEDINGS OF SECTIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, A.B.A. 121-35 (1963)(Austria, Switzerland,
France, Hungary).
2 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole. 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). The United States Supreme Court first approved the rule in Arcam-
bel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 306 (1796).
3 The term "costs," which is amenable to several interpretations, is herein used to indicate
those expenses attendant to litigation which may be taxed against a disputant.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54 (d), provides in part:
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United
States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs ....
The various states have similar provisions. See, e.g., OHIO R. Civ. P. 54(D).
Elements of taxable costs in federal court litigation are enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1970). Such costs include the various fees payable to the court and its functionaries and related
items of expense. They do not include the expense of legal counsel, with the technical exception
of a nominal docket fee, typically $20.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1970).
, The term "no-fee rule" is used herein to denote the general American rule that attorney's
fees are not awarded to a victorious litigant. The term "fee-shifting" will hereinafter be em-
ployed generically to indicate deviation from the no-fee rule.
I The State of Alaska is the only American jurisdiction in which the no-fee rule is wholly
inoperative. Victorious litigants are routinely awarded counsel fees as costs by Alaskan state
courts. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973). The amount of such an award is determined by
applying a percentage to the amount of monetary judgment, the percentage, from among
several alternative figures, to be applied depends upon the stage of the litigation process at
which the dispute is terminated. ALAS. R. CiV. P. 82(a). Where computation of an award in
COMMENT
spired acerbic commentary from many quarters.7 Dispite these con-
tinuing attacks, the no-fee rule has enjoyed persistent vitality
throughout our nation's history.
Proposals for the complete abrogation of the no-fee rule8 have
been to no avail. Moreover, throughout most of the past two hundred
years, the American judiciary has been loathe to sanction any far-
reaching deviation from the traditional allocation of attorney's fees?
However, the no-fee rule is not inviolable, and exceptions to its appli-
this manner is unsuitable,"the court shall award a fee commensurate with the amount and value
of legal services rendered." Id.
Nevada has a partial indemnity system. The courts of Nevada are empowered to make
an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing litigant who recovers not more than $10,000 or who
successfully defends an action wherein the amount prayed for does not exceed $10,000. See NEV.
REV. STAT. § 18.010(3) (1971). Other states have statutory provision for limited fee-shifting.
However, the maximum amounts which may be awarded under such statutes are usually
nominal, as under the federal scheme.
I Professor Ehrenzweig has been perhaps the most vehement critic of the no-fee rule. See
Ehrenzweig, supra note 1; Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 CALIF. ST. B. J.
107 (1951). He opined that the no-fee rule fosters "the power and, indeed, the right of a losing
party in a civil suit to inflict on the winner not only the misery but also the expense of enforcing
his just claim." Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 792-93. Professor Ehrenzweig's disenchantment
with the no-fee rule was buttressed by personal exposure to its harshness and inequity as an
impoverished immigrant in the United States. Id. at 792.
Professor Ehrenzweig was neither the first nor the most recent detractor of the no-fee rule.
A nineteenth century American writer termed the no-fee rule "a lingering remnant of the old
barbaric dispensation, when philosophy, justice and common sense were sacrificed to formal
and senseless precedents." Watson, A Rationale of the Law of Costs, 16 CENT. L. J. 306, 307
(1883). Fifty years ago, the Judicial Council of Massachusetts evinced disbelief in the correct-
ness of the rule, posing, but unable to persuasively answer, the question: "On what principle of
justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover his doctor's bill but
not his lawyer's bill?" First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MASs. L. Q.
7, 64 (1925). Many commentators have since voiced dissatisfaction with the no-fee rule. See,
e.g., Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 13 CALIF. ST. B. J. 42 (1938); Greenberger, The
Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REv. 400 (1964);
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963);
McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services,
40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1972); Stirling, Attorney's Fees: Who Should Bear the Burden?, 41
CALIF. ST. B. J. 874 (1966), Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the
Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967).
8 Most commentators who have expressed disapproval of the no-fee rule have advocated
the adoption of some type of across-the-board indemnity system. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra
note 1; Greenberger, supra note 7, Kuenzel, supra note 7; Professor Stoebuck has offered a
draft statute governing the allocation of attorney's fees. Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 211-18.
1 Particularly during the 1800's, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated unyield-
ing adherence to the no-fee rule, usually without offering substantial explanation for its posture.
This phenomenon is exemplified in the following line of cases: Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S.
(3 Dal.) 306 (1796); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852); Oerlichs v. Spain, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878). When exceptions to
the no-fee rule were later recognized, they were quite narrowly applied. See notes 107-36 injra
and accompanying text.
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cations have been carved out by legislatures ° and by the courts."
While some judicially created equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule
have long been recognized, the past decade has witnessed a dramatic
broadening of the circumstances wherein equitable fee-shifting has
been undertaken by federal courts. 2 This laudable trend was abruptly
curbed earlier this year by the United States Supreme Court.
It is the thesis of this note that lower federal court decisions of
the past several years constituted a significant and welcome departure
from traditionally rigid judicial adherence to the no-fee rule and its
narrowly circumscribed exceptions and that the Supreme Court's
recent disapproval of these developments is lamentable. The discus-
sion will initially present an overview of the no-fee rule, briefly trac-
ing its English antecedents, suggesting the bases for its development
in the United States, and then surveying the values which it purport-
edly serves and considering the criticisms which have been levelled
against it. The focus will then shift to the exceptions to the no-fee
rule. First, the long-recognized exceptions will be detailed. This note
will then describe the extension of traditional grounds for equitable
fee-shifting to encompass a greater variety of situations and will
outline the culmination of this process of extension in the emergence
of a new formulation for the equitable award of attorney's fees, the
conceptually broad "private attorney general" doctrine. This discus-
sion will next offer an assessment of this new equitable fee-shifting
doctrine by exploring its theoretical underpinnings in two decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, reviewing its articulation and
use by the lower federal courts, and suggesting reasons for its sound-
ness as a basis for exercising discretionary judicial power. Finally,
this note will examine the recent Supreme Court case, Alyeska Pipe
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 3 in which the Supreme Court
severely curtailed the power of the federal courts to award attorney's
fees and will attempt to demonstrate that the Court's reasoning was
flawed and that the holding in the case was unduly broad.
10 See notes 86 and 87 infra.
See notes 101-243 infra and accompanying text.
12 Consideration of state court fee-shifting is beyond the scope of this note. Recent trends
in the expansion of rationales for fee awards are most dramatically apparent in federal court
decisions. However, equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule, where applicable to the particular
set of circumstances presented by a piece of litigation, should lead to fee-shifting regardless of
the forum. There is a single body equity, and its principles should possess validity in all
American jurisdictions.
13 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
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II. GENESIS AND PERPETUATION OF THE NO-FEE RULE
A. Allocation of Attorney's Fees in England
The contemporary practice in England is that attorney's fees are
routinely awarded as costs to successful litigants, 4 although a trial
court may, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to make such an
award. 5 The current English system for allocation of attorney's fees
has prevailed in essentially the same form 6 since 1875,1 the result of
an evolutionary process of six centuries' duration. Historically, the
treatment of attorney's fees in England was a function of the demar-
cation between law and equity.'
At early common law there was no judicial allocation of litiga-
tion expenses among litigants. 9 However, an unsuccessful plaintiff
was amerced-assessed a fine payable to the crown-for asserting an
untenable claim.2 0 The law made no provision for imposition of a
similar fine upon a losing defendant." The Statute of Gloucester,22
enacted in 1275, first provided for award of litigation expenses by
English law courts.23 That statute authorized taxation of costs only
against unseccessul defendants, its one-sidedness apparently "based
upon the theory that the amercement in favor of the crown would be
sufficient to deter the prosecution of wrongful demands, but that the
damages awarded against a defendant in misericordia were insuffi-
cient to discourage the interposition of wrongful defenses, or to reim-
burse the plaintiff for his expenses. '24 On its face the Statute of
11 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 54.7712] at 1703 (2d ed. 1974).
,s Id.
" For a cogent explanation of the modern English procedure for the taxation of costs,
including attorney's fees, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L. J. 849, 856-72 (1929). A more
thoroughgoing treatment of the same subject appears in R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (5th ed. 1967).
t7 Goodhart, supra note 16, at 854.
,I Id. at 851.
, 2 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 597 (2d ed. 1898).
It has been suggested that the effects of this rule were not immutable in practice: "[Ilt appears
that attempts were made. . . to reimburse the plaintiff, by taking his expenses into considera-
tion in measuring his damages; but this custom never became a rule and was rarely and
reluctantly followed." Watson, supra note 7, at 306-07 (citations omitted).
20 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1852). The amercement was assessed
pro falso clamore. Goodhart, supra note 16, at 852.
22 A losing defendant "was in misericordia for his unjust detention of the plaintiff's right,
but was not liable to the payment of any costs of suit, at least under that title." Goodhart, supra
note 16, at 852.
2 6 Edw. I, c. 1 (1275).
" Goodhart, supra note 16, at 852. The Statute of Gloucester was purportedly predicated
by public displeasure with the plight of successful plaintiffs who were saddled with the expense
of vindicating their rights. Watson, supra note 7, at 307.
24 Watson, supra note 7, at 307; see also Goodhart, supra note 16, at 853.
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Gloucester provided merely for recovery of the "costs of writ" in
actions for land, 2 the type of action in which plaintiffs' expenses were
greatest,2 but the courts soon came to construe the enactment to
mandate the award of all litigation expenses in any case wherein the
plaintiff recovered damages.2 Statutory authorization for recovery of
costs, including attorney's fees by vindicated defendants followed
more than three hundred years later.28
On the equity side the ability to award appropriate costs, includ-
ing counsel fees was traditionally among the broad discretionary
powers reposed in the English Chancellor.29 A 1394 enactment" sup-
plied a statutory underpinning for the discretionary award of costs
in equity. Whether that statute actually created equity's power to
award costs31 or was simply declaratory of an inherent equitable
power 32 is not entirely clear. However, the preferred view seems to
be that the power to make discretionary awards of costs antedated
the statute.33 With the passage of the Supreme Court of Judicature
Acts of 1873 3 and 1875,'3 law and equity assumed essentially. equal
footing with respect to the award of costs,38 a situation which still
prevails.37 Those two enactments vested in law courts substantial
discretionary latitude, establishing their authority to forego the usual
award of costs to a prevailing party "for good cause, ' 38
2 Watson, supra note 7, at 307.
26 Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUm. L. REv.
78, 79 (1953).
2 Goodhart, supra note 16, at 852-53; Watson, supra note 7, at 307.
21 4 Jac. I, c. 3 (1607). There were some intervening statutory developments. See Note,
supra note 26, at 80.
29 Goodhart, supra note 16, at 854.
" 17 Rich. II, c. 6 (1394).
31 It has been stated that "the Chancellor's power to award costs originated by statute
." Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216,
1217 n. 6 (1967). See also Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1917).
32 See King and Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental
Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REV. 27, 32 (1973).
3 Sir Arthur Goodhart said: "The better view seems to be that the power was inherent,
and it is clear that the courts have acted on this view." Goodhart, supra note 16, at 854 (citing
Andrews v. Barnes, 39 Ch.D. 133 (1888); Corporation of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551
(1743)).
3, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (1873).
38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (1875).
26 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 54.7012], at 1302 (2d ed. 1974).
See King and Plater, supra note 32, at 32.
3' Goodhart, supra note 16, at 854.
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B. Emergence of the American No-Fee Rule
The history of costs in colonial America is clouded. 9 Following
the Revolution the then operating English system of costs was re-
ceived as an element of the common law of the United States. 0 That
is, costs, including attorney's fees, could be awarded to victorious
litigants, but only pursuant to statute in actions at law.4 However,
there has always been a disparity between the United States and
England with respect to the actual incidence of fee-shifting. Several
theories have been offered in explanation of this disparity.
Professor Ehrenzweig insisted that prevailing litigants are not
routinely awarded their attorney's fees as costs in the United States
solely because of an "historical accident."42 Recognizing that many
states had legislatively provided for recovery of attorney's fees during
the nation's first half century,43 he contended that such statutes fell
into disuse through inadvertence. Legislatures commited the "fatal
mistake of fixing the amount recoverable in dollars and cents rather
than in percentages of the amount recovered or claimed."44 Charges
made for legal services increased with the passage of time, and the
prescriptions of the fixed-amount statutes which authorized fee recov-
ery became economically unrealistic. Thus, Professor Ehrenzweig
asserted, as such statutes were stripped of practical impact, they were
disregarded, and the no-fee rule was born of a "process of gradual
forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument. . .. "I'
Many commentators do not subscribe to Professor Ehrenzweig's
"historical accident" theory. Some writers have suggested that the
31 Conflicting views have been expressed concerning the early colonial treatment of litiga-
tion expenses. Several writers have asserted that costs, including attorney's fees, were typically
awarded to prevailing litigants in colonial America. See, e.g., Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 640 (1974); Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216, 1218 (1967).
Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 78, 80
(1953). Others have intimated that the general English system of allocating the expenses of
litigation among disputants was not adopted by the early colonists. See Ehrenzweig, supra note
I, at 798; Goodhart, supra note 16, at 873; Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among
Litigants, 49 YALE L. J. 699, 700 (1940).
40 6 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 54.70[21, at 1303 (2d ed. 1974).
" Id. See also notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
'z See Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 798-99.
'3 Many jurisdictions enacted statutes authorizing widespread fee-shifting. However, such
statutes, most of which were passed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
limited fee awards to rather small monetary amounts. These statutes are collected in Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1218-19 nn.
13-15 (1967).
" Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 799.
45 Id.
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no-fee rule is an outgrowth of widely held seventeenth century distrust
of lawyers. 6 Throughout much of the colonial era, the legal profes-
sion was held in low esteem:
In every one of the Colonies, practically throughout the Seventeenth
Century, the lawyer or attorney was a character of disrepute and
suspicion . . . . In many of the Colonies, persons acting as attor-
neys were forbidden to receive any fee; in some all paid attorneys
were barred from the courts . ..
Adherents of the view that the no-fee rule was spawned by long-
standing disdain for lawyers theorize that the later statutes providing
for recovery of attorney's fees48 were enacted only after the legal
profession had achieved enhanced social esteem. They believe that
legislatures intentionally prescribed rigid dollar amount limits for fee
awards due to vestigial suspicion of lawyers."
At least one writer has taken a broader view, advancing a more
comprehensive and, it is submitted, more credible explanation for the
nascence of the no-fee rule.5' According to this theory, the cumulation
of diverse social, political and economic factors, including distrust of
lawyers, predicated adoption of the no-fee rule in the United States.
One such factor was the colonial perception of the law. During the
seventeenth century the law was viewed as an amalgam of simple
rules which could easily be comprehended by the citizenry.52 Thus
utilization of trained legal counsel, and concomitant payment of at-
torney's fees were not seen as indispensable requisites for successful
litigation. This belief was undoubtedly reinforced by the fact that
many judges were not lawyers.5"
The early Americans' simplistic view of the law comported well
with the individualistic spirit of the times. The same strident individu-
alism and self-reliance which led to the rejection of the fetters of
English domination and fostered exploration of the western frontier
also demanded that each man be willing to defend himself, whether
11 See, e.g., Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 78, 80 (1953); Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE. L. J.
699, 701 (1940).
4' C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 4 (1911).
" See note 43 supra.
" See Goodhart, supra note 16, at 873.
" See sources cited in note 46 supra.
51 See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv.
1216, 1218-21 (1967).
52 Goodhart, supra note 16, at 873. See generally C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR 4-16 (1911).
13 Goodhart, supra note 16, at 873.
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in court or elsewhere. 54 At a time when legal representation was
considered non-essential, there existed little need for awards of attor-
ney's fees. On the contrary, provision for fee awards might have
stimulated the use of attorneys by disputants, a decidedly unwanted
development to many in light of the legal profession's general disre-
pute.55 Moreover, the colonial courtroom was an arena which pro-
vided drama and amusement for spectators and offered litigants
oportunity to display their argumentative capabilities.56 The introduc-
tion of trained counsel into such an atmosphere might have spoiled
the contest, giving the represented party an unfair advantage. And
even if one party chose to retain an attorney, the ethic of the "game"
required that he alone should bear the cost.58 It is these early Ameri-
can attitudes - emphasis upon individual action and responsibility,
distrust of lawyers, simplistic perception of the law, and belief that
litigation was a "game" - which were the foundation of the no-fee
rule.59
Whichever of the offered rationales for the no-fee rule's origina-
tion one chooses to accept, it is asserted that the rationale scarcely
constitutes a compelling justification for retention of the no-fee rule
today. Certainly if Professor Ehrenzweig's "historical accident"
theory is valid, there exists no valid reason why modern litigants
should continue to bear the brunt of early nineteenth century legisla-
tive imprudence. Furthermore, even if, as most commentators sug-
gest, the inception of the no-fee rule can be linked to salient policy
considerations, reflective of deeply ingrained seventeenth and eight-
eenth century values and belief, the United States has long ceased to
11 The conditions of early American living mandated that persons be capable of fending
for themselves in the face of adversity. Accentuation of the virtues of independent action and
self-sufficiency did not abate at the courthouse door. On the contrary, self-representation by
litigants-one man pitted against another without the interference of lawyers-was wholly
consistent with the individualistic tenor of early American life. See generally R. POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 124-45 (1921).
" See Goodhart, supra note 16, at 873.
5 C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 258 (1935).
'7 Dean Roscoe Pound stated that the American legal system early embraced the "theory
of litigation as a fair fight, according to the canons of the manly art, with a court to see fair
play and to prevent interference." R. POUND, supra note 54, at 13. Given this view, the use of
counsel might be seen to distort the functioning of the legal process, both hindering the course
of justice and detracting from the entertainment value of litigation. See generally id. at 124-
28.
'a Note, Attorney's Fees, Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216,
1220-21 (1967).
'1 It has been suggested that post-Revolution antipathy for England and its institutions
also helped foster the development of the no-fee rule in the United States. Comment, Court
Awarded Attorney's Fees and EqualAccess to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 641 (1974).
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be a fledgling, predominantly agrarian society. This fact has been
amply noted by those who have disparaged the no-fee rule.
C. Contemporary Evaluation of the No-Fee Rule
The most frequently cited6 deficiency of the no-fee is that it
effectively precludes resort to the adjudicatory process by a sizeable
portion of the citizenry." The cost of retained private counsel may
be prohibitive for a substantial number of Americans, 2 including
many who cannot be categorized as "indigent." 63 In the absence of
fee-shifting, it may be more practical to endure an injustice than to
seek legal redress:
Current practice tends to deter the prosecution of even clearly meri-
torious small claims by litigants who could at best recover less than
the often high expenses of counsel . . . . And what is true for
plaintiffs also holds for defendants: the cost of defending against an
unjust small claim may easily exceed the cost of simply paying what
is demanded. This result is distasteful, for it ranks legal rights by
dollar value .... 64
While various schemes have been employed to assist potential
litigants, such devices fail to fully remedy the problem. For example,
legal aid programs, whether privately or publicly funded, do not offer
sufficient breadth of coverage to furnish representation for all who
are in need of assistance. Because limited financial and human re-
sources are devoted to such programs, 5 they are burdened with ex-
ceedingly heavy caseloads. Hence "it is physically impossible for
legal services, legal aid and other programs established to give civil
legal assistance to the poor to serve all, or even a majority, of those
60 See note 7 supra.
66 "Strangely, terribly, intolerably, these United States, this citadel of democracy, which
has taken it on itself to play the decisive role in building the Rule of Law throughout the world,
has forgotten the little man in his struggle for civil justice." Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 793.
62 The problem of practical unavailability of legal counsel has been extensively discussed.
See, e.g., Carlin and Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
381 (1964): Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L. REv. 516
(1968).
63 See Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The
Problem, the Duty, and a Solution, 26 U. PiT. L. REv. 811 (1965).
6, Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 636, 650 (1974). See Stirling, supra note 7.
65 It has been estimated that in 1969 there were only 4,000 attorneys working on behalf
of the 16.5% of the population whose incomes fell below the federal poverty level; over 200,000
attorneys served those whose income levels were in the upper 20%. See Siver, The Imminent
Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URBAN L. 217,
217-18 (1969).
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unable otherwise to obtain legal representation."66 Since scarce re-
sources must be expended where the need is greatest, legal aid pro-
grams may be required to concentrate their efforts upon representa-
tion of the very poor. 7 Thus members of the working class who, only
through substantial financial sacrifice, are able to retain paid counsel
are often altogether excluded from the ambit of legal aid programs."
Moreover, the quality of services made available through such pro-
grams is, at least in some instances, suspect.69
The problems confronted by those who lack the means to employ
legal counsel on a pay-as-you-go basis can be partially alleviated by
use of the contingent fee system.7" However, the contingent fee
method of obtaining representation has been labelled "champertous"
by some observers," and it is unquestionably open to criticism on a
variety of grounds." And although contingent fee arrangements per-
mit some plaintiffs to obtain legal counsel without out-of-pocket ex-
pense, they provide little help to those claimants who seek non-
91 Id. at 217. See generally Clark, Legal Services Programs-The Caseload Problem, or
How to Avoid Becoming the New Welfare Department, 47 J. URBAN L. 797 (1970); Bellow,
Reflections on Case-Load Limitation, 26 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 195 (1969); Note,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV.
805 (1967).
11 See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301,
306-07 (1973).
11 See id. See also Comment, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil
Matters: The Problem, the Duty, and a Solution, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 811 (1965).
11 The enormous disparity between demand for and resources allocated to legal aid pro-
grams, and the resultant heavy caseloads borne by legal aid attorneys, suggest that clients of
such programs may sometimes receive inadequate attention. Cf. Clark, supra note 66, at 798.
10 The contingent fee arrangement enables some claimants to procure legal counsel with
little or no out-of-pocket expense since the lawyer accepts a specified proportion of the ultimate
recovery, if any, in exchange for his services. A thorough discussion of contingent fees appears
in F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
7' Professor Ehrenzweig referred to the contingent fee as "that legitimate sibling of crimi-
nal champerty, . . . an incurable sympton of an uncured disease." Ehrenzweig, supra note I,
at 794. There has been much debate concerning the propriety of arrangements whereby lawyers
have direct financial stakes in the course and outcome of litigation. See, e.g., Comment, Are
Contingent Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to Pay a Retainer?, 20 OHIO ST. L. J. 329 (1959);
Note, Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15 (1972). The contin-
gent fee system is an outgrowth of the no-fee rule, and it has been suggested that resistance to
fundamental change in the American method of allocating litigants' expenses has been spear-
headed by lawyers who have vested interests in the continued attractiveness of contingent fee
arrangements to potential claimants. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden
Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1226 & notes 48-50 (1967).
72 The contingent fee contributes heavily to the congestion of court dockets. Id. It may
foster the use of dilatory tactics to exploit the nuisance value of litigation, or it can create
situations in which, contrary to his client's best interest, there is substantial monetary incentive
for an attorney to accept an early settlement offer. See F. MACKINNON supra note 70, at 159-
200. See also sources cited in note 71 supra.
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monetary relief or those whose damage claims are not clearly merito-
rious, nor do they aid defendants. The efficacy of small claims courts,
where available, as a forum for redress of wrongs suffered by the
"little guy" is doubtful. 73 The reality of small claims court litigation
has led some to speculate "whether the original promise of speedy
and inexpensive justice for the poor litigant has not been wildly dis-
torted into a speedy and inexpensive collection mechanism for credi-
tors. '74 Due to great variations in the mechanical and procedural
characteristics of small claims court,75 broad generalizations concern-
ing their effectiveness are perhaps unwarranted. It will suffice to note
that only a limited range of actions fall within small claims jurisdic-
tion, that trained counsel may nonetheless be necessary for successful
small claims litigation, 76 and that an impecunious defendant has little
control over the court in which he is sued. Thus small claims courts,
like legal aid programs and the contingent fee system, do not present
a complete solution to the problems of persons embroiled in legal
disputes but unable to afford regular attorney's fees.7
It has been contended that the no-fee rule in fact provides less
disincentive to the assertion of legal rights by the less-than-wealthy
than does a fee recovery system. The Supreme Court has recognized
the argument "that since litigation is at best uncertain one should not
be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that
the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
73 As an American lawyer I know that the little man's only refuge, the small
claims court, is unavailable in innumerable communities; and that where it exists, it
is prevailingly a collection agency, and presents otherwise the horrifying spectacle
of a court without law, abandoned by the legal profession ....
Ehrenzweig, supra note I, at 795-96. But see Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and
Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 651 (1974).
11 Steadman and Rosenstein, "Small Claims" Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court: An Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1309, 1309-10 (1973). Divergent
views have been expressed. Compare Note, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-
Income Litigant as Performed by the Samll Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657
(1969), with Comment, The California Small Claims Court, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 876 (1964).
11 Small claims courts in various jurisdictions differ with respect to what persons are
entitled to sue, whether attorneys may appear, subject matter jurisdictional limitations, the
expense of bringing suit, available avenues of post-trial action and other matters. See Steadman
and Rosenstein, supra note 74, at 1317-25.
78 Even a claim involving a small dollar amount may feature issues sufficiently complex
to make the use of counsel, especially where the opposing party is represented by an attorney,
highly desirable. Although not conclusive, the results of one study indicate that "representation
by an attorney would seem to enhance the plaintiffs chances of success or at least to avert a
judgment for defendant" in Philadelphia small claims actions. Id. at 1333.
11 See Ehrenzweig, supa note 1, at 794-96; Kuenzel, supra note 7, at 84-85; Kirng and
Plater, supra note 32, at 35-37; Kuenzel, supra note 7, at 84-85.
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opponents' counsel."" Even if "litigation is at best uncertain," how-
ever, it must be assumed that more often than not American tribunals
render just decisions when each party is represented by competent
counsel. 79 The prospect of assessment of the opposing party's counsel
fees might"0 deter some potential litigants in close cases. It would
nonetheless obviate the choice, which may present itself under the no-
fee rule, between forebearing assertion of a meritorious claim (or
declining to defend against a specious claim) and winning a lawsuit
to one's financial detriment."
Under the no-fee rule, in most situations, a wronged party can-
not be made whole.12 Even where a litigant receives a damage judg-
ment in excess of his attorney's fees, he is not, in the absence of fee-
shifting, restored to the position which he would have occupied had
he never been the victim of a legal wrong. The Supreme Court long
ago intimated that fee-shifting was not necessary to compensate a
victorious litigant completely, viewing the victor's attorney's fees as
only a remote consequence of the losing opponent's actions.8 3 This
notion, if ever reasonable, has little merit today. Access to the courts
is crucial to the vindication of legal rights, 4 and it cannot be seriously
suggested that persons should venture into litigation without the as-
's Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
7 Professor Goodhart issued the classic rejoinder to the argument that fee-shifting is
particularly unfair because of the uncertainty of litigation. It had been contended that fee-
shifting "is based on the wholly unwarranted assumption that the losing party in litigation is
always, or even ordinarily, in the wrong." Satterthwaite, Increasing Costs to be Paid by the
Losing Party, 46 N.J. L. J. 133, 133 (1923). In response, Professor Goodhart said:
Is not the answer to this that the costs must be paid by one party or the other, and
that, in spite of Mr. Satterthwaite's pessimism, it is at least more probable that the
losing party was in the wrong? If New Jersey justice is so much a matter of luck, it
hardly seems worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it would be cheaper, and
certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin.
Goodhart, supra note 16, at 877.
10 It has been persuasively argued that information presently available does not afford a
basis for confident prediction of the effect of fee-shifting on litigation decisions. See Mause,
Winner Takes All: A Re-examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REv. 26 (1969).
sI For example, suppose that A has suffered a legal wrong and resultant damage in the
amount of $200 at the hands of B. The probable cost of obtaining legal counsel to prosecute an
action against B is $500. A thus has a choice between living with his $200 loss or invoking the
legal process, with the likely result being a net loss of $300. Such dilemmas may occur fre-
quently in situations where a prospective plaintiff, although entitled to some type of relief, does
not have a viable claim for damages. See Stirling, supra note 7.
12 See Greenberger, supra note 7, at 406-07; McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expen-
ses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 643 (1931).
3 See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878).
sM The Supreme Court has observed that in some circumstances "litigation may be the sole
practicable avenue open" for the assertion of legal rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430 (1963). Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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sistance of trained legal counsel. 5
The no-fee rule was born in an era of uncrowded court dockets,
when resort to litigation was to be encouraged." Today, when vir-
tually all jurisdictions are beset by docket backlogs which cause seri-
ous delays in the administration of justice, settlement of disputes is
preferable to full-scale adjudication. 7 The no-fee rule can discourage
just settlement of disputes by affording a wealthy disputant uncons-
cionable leverage over an impecunious adversary. In a protracted
battle of attrition with ever-mounting counsel fees it is the "little guy"
who must invariably succumb, Thus the no-fee rule may foster the
use of dilatory tactics,8 exacerbating the problems of our over-
crowded courts. Furthermore the no-fee rule fails to adequately deter
the prosecution of claims which are wholly specious.8" Abrogation of
the no-fee rule, says some of its critics, would therefore decrease the
aggregate volume of litigation." Although any generalization about
the impact of wholesale fee-shifting upon the quantum of litigation
is highly speculative,9' it is indisputable that the award of attorney's
fees can affect the types of claims and parties which come before the
courts.9" It is recognition of this fact which has led to the development
of limited exceptions to the no-fee rule. Realizing that the no-fee rule
can operate dysfunctionally, Congress and the federal judiciary have
5 The Supreme Court has, of course, recognized the extreme importance of legal represen-
tation in the context of criminal actions. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). It has
been suggested that much of the reasoning brought to bear in the Court's criminal right-to-
counsel decisions applies with like force in the civil litigation context. See Note, The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322 (1966).
s' See generally R. POUND, supra note 54, at 124-45.
See generally Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
's See Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L.
Rev. 78, 87-94 (1953).
11 See Kuenzel, supra note 7, at 78-80; Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 202. Fee-shifting has
been used as a method of deterring specious legal action in a rather narrow range of circumstan-
ces. See notes 107-24 infra and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 7, at 404-05; Stoebuck, supra note 7, at 202; Note,
Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 78, 82-94
(1953).
"1 One writer has contended that the effects of across-the-board fee awards are uncertain.
Mause, supra note 80. He stresses that prospective litigants are usually unable to view the
merits of their cases dispassionately. Id. at 31-32. He concludes that "analysis indicates that
indemnity in favor of all successful litigants is as least as likely to encourage litigation as to
discourage it." Id. at 35.
12 Although he contends that "many of the asserted advantages of a general rule of
indemnity must be characterized as illusory-at least until more evidence concerning the behav-
ior of litigants is somehow made available," id. at 27, even Professor Mause recognizes that
fee-shifting can be a useful tool for influencing litigation and litigants. Id. at 38-50.
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employed a selective, and oft-times haphazard, approach to sanction
fee-shifting in situations where the adverse effects of the no-fee rule
are most severe.
II. TRADITIONALLY RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE No-FEE
RULE
A. Statutory Provision for Fee-Shifting
The no-fee rule is subject to modification or negation by stat-
ute. 3 Congress has enacted legislation which authorizes the award
of attorney's fees in a variety of contexts, most of which are quite
limited. Congressional sanction of fee-shifting during recent years has
centered upon civil rights94 and environmental" actions. Statutory
fee-shifting may be mandatory or permissive. 7 Where Congress has
provided that a victorious litigant "may" recover attorney's fees, the
propriety of such an award is for the discretion of the court in each
case. Since federal courts are generally empowered to make discre-
tionary awards of attorney's fees,9" explicit legislative authorization
for discretionary fee-shifting could be viewed as surplusage." How-
" Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
A situation similar to those wherein fee-shifting is statutorily mandated is presented when
disputants have consented to allocate attorney's fees in a given manner. A contractual arrange-
ment which provides for fee-shifting among the parties will be enforced by the courts. Id. For
a thorough discussion of contractual allocation of litigation expense, see 2 S. SPEISER,
ATTORNEYS' FEES 283-368 (1973).
" See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 1974) (school desegregation actions). 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3(b) (1970) (public accomodations). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970) (equal employment
opportunity).
" See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1974) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. 1974) (Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-2(d) (Supp. 1974) (Clean Air Act).
," See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970) (Packers and Stockyards Act); 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b)
(1970) (Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act); 15'U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (Clayton Act); 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) (Truth in Lending Act); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970) (Merchant Marine
Act); 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 908(b) (1970) (Interstate Commerce Act).
" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), r(a) (1970) (Securities Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. §
77www(a) (1970) (Trust Indenture Act); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970) (Copyright Act); 35 U.S.C. §
285 (1970) (Patent Act); 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970) (Servicemen's Readjustment Act).
" See notes 101-06 infra and accompanying text. But see Aleyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975), discussed in notes 331-77 infra and accompanying text.
' Some lower federal courts apparently adopted this view with respect to the discretionary
fee-shifting provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
Many courts ascribed little, if any, significance to the explicit congressional authorization of
fee awards in that statute. See. e.g., Bell v. Alamatt Hotel, 243 F.Supp. 472 (N.D. Miss. 1966);
Adams v. Fazzio Real Estate Co., 268 F.Supp. 630 (E.D. La.), affd, 396 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.
1968). The Supreme Court gave the same section a different reading in Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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ever, the Supreme Court has construed one such provision to require
the award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in the absence of
a compelling reason to deny fee-shifting.'
B. Equitable Fee-Shifting
It has long been accepted that federal courts possess the power
to award attorney's fees to litigants through the exercise of equitable
discretion, and the "power to award such fees 'is part of the original
authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.' "",
Circuit Judge Booth, nearly fifty years ago in Guardian Trust Co. v,
Kansas City Southern Railway Co.,"'2 presented an exhaustive discus-
sion of the power to award attorney's fees as costs in equity." He
determined that the federal courts have always been so empowered:
The United States courts of equity at the time of their creation
became endowed with the powers, including that over costs, pos-
sessed by the English Chancery Court. . . . They have exercised
such power, and the power has never been taken from them."4
The inherent"' power of the federal courts to undertake equita-
ble fee-shifting has been invoked whenever "overriding considera-
tions of justice seems to compel such a result.""' The federal courts
have long recognized two types of situations as entailing those "over-
riding consideration" which justify the discretionary award of attor-
ney's fees.
"0o Id. The Court made a similar ruling with respect to 20 U.S.C. § 1617 in Northcross v.
Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427 (1973).
"0I Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 166 (1939).
102 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
102 Id. at 240-46.
'o, Id. at 241. See also Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S.(7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); Fontain v.
Ravenel, 58 U.S.(17 How.) 369, 384 (1855). Over a century ago, referring to its original equity
jurisdiction in some cases, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen the Constitution of the United States conferred that jurisdiction on this
court, it cannot be construed to exclude the power possessed and constantly exercised
in every court of equity then known, to use its discretion to award or refuse costs,
as its judgment of the case, in that particular, might require. The court entertains
no doubt of its power to award costs ...
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 460, 462 (1855). The
power over costs discussed by the Court included the ability to award attorney's fees. The Court
had previously instructed that federal courts adopt English equity practices in situations not
otherwise covered by the Equity Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. EQUITY R. 33, 20
U.S. (7 Wheat.) xiii (1822).
'o Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939).
"' Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,718 (1967). See Hall
v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970).
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1. The "bad faith" equitable exception to the no-fee rule
The long-standing equitable exception to the no-fee rule applies
when a litigant has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for
oppressive reasons."' 17 Fee-shifting in such circumstances is a wholly
natural function of equity's broad powers for the achievement of
justice between the parties.1 8 Furthermore it should be recognized
that recovery of attorney's fees by a party whose opponent has exhib-
ited blatant disregard for legal rules does not contravene two of the
arguments most frequently asserted in support of continued adher-
ence to the no-fee rule. First, fee-shifting pursuant to the bad faith
equitable exception does not unduly inhibit resort to litigation.0 ' Sec-
ond, the bad faith exception does not entail the shifting of attorney's
fees to a party who has been only remotely responsible for the genera-
tion of his opponent's legal expense.1 When a litigant is forced to
incur the expense of legal counsel in order to obtain protection from
flagrant abuse of his legal rights, it is clear that his attorney's fees
arise as a proximate result of his opponent's reprehensible conduct.1
The bad faith equitable exception to the no-fee rule has been
employed by the federal courts,' but its use has been infrequent."'
A party's bad faith must be clearly established before fee-shifting is
warranted. The courts frequently requiring the existence of wilfull-
ness1 by the offending party. The Supreme Court has distilled the
WI 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[2], at 1709 (2d ed. 1974).
,o See generally Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir.
1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
"' See notes 78-81 supra and accompanying text. While it is said that the right to litigate
is of overwhelming importance, and fears that fee-shifting may deter good faith litigants have
been voiced, presumably no one is interested in encouraging bad faith litigation.
11 See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
II, The causal relationship between a party's bad faith and the expenses incurred by his
opponent was confronted by the court in Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F.Supp. 568
(E.D.N.Y. 1934). The court found that plaintiff's stockholders suit was groundless and awarded
attorney's fees to the defendant. However, the fee awarded was for only $2000, the portion of
the defendant's total legal expenses of $5000 which the court deemed directly attributable to
plaintiff's "vexatious" conduct.
"I See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root
Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923);
Federal Facilities Realty Trust v. Kulp, 227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955); Schlein v. Smith, 160
F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947); In re Swartz, 130 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1942). See also 6 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.7712], at 1709-11 & n. 17 (2d ed. 1974).
"I See generally Note, Use of Taxable Costs to Regulate the Conduct of Litigants, 53
COLUNt. L. REv. 78 (1953); Note, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE
L. J. 699 (1940).
"I See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962) ("willful and persistent"
failure to render obligatory performance); Federal Facilities Realty Trust v. Kulp, 227 F.2d
657, 658 (7th Cir. 1955) ("willfulness . . .is a major consideration" in civil contempt cases
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essence of the bad faith exception in stating that fee-shifting is war-
ranted "if the court finds after a proper hearing that fraud has been
practiced upon it, or that the very temple of justice has been defiled
"115
The requisite bad faith for equitable fee-shifting may be mani-
fested by the event or behavior upon which the litigation is premised,"
or by dilatory and objectionable tactics after legal action has been
commenced.11 7 The bad faith exception has been used when a party
has been held in civil contempt,"5s where a party has brought spurious
issues before the court,120 and, on occasion, where there has been
repeated failure to satisfy a legal obligation .12 Fee-shifting under the
bad faith rule has also been held to be proper where the principal
dispute culminates in out-of-court settlement.122 Clearly, the bad faith
exception has a punitive' focus, 123 but its deterrent effect has not been
substantialM Nevertheless, the traditional bad faith exception has
helped to provide a springboard for a more expansive approach to
equitable fee-shifting. 2 5
2. The "Common Fund" Equitable Exception to the No-Fee Rule
The other traditionally recognized equitable exception to the no-
wherein indemnity for attorney's fees sought).
115 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co. 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
ne See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root
Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946); Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
1I See, e.g., City Bank of Honolulu v. Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367 (1st Cir. 1971);
Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
775 (1945); In re Swartz, 130 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1942); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 6 F.Supp
568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934).
"I See, e.g., Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923); Federal
Facilities Realty Trust v. Kulp, 227 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1955); Feldman v. American Palestine
Line, Inc., 18 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1927). But see Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 1973).
I See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946); Schlein v.
Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
I' See, e.g., Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); In re Swartz, 130 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1942); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales
Corp., 6 F.Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). But see Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete
Prods., 374 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1967); Gold Dust Corp. v. Hoffenberg, 87 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937);
Abel v. Loughman, 1 F.R.D. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
'2' See, e.g., Local No. 149 International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural
Implement Workers v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1962); Rolax v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
m See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1971).
121 See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939); cf. Universal Oil Prods.
Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
12' See authorities cited in notes 88-90 supra.
125 See notes 137-44 infra and accompanying text.
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fee rule, the "common fund" exception, applies in situations where a
litigant creates, preserves or enhances a fund of money or other
valuable assets. 12 1 If, through the efforts of a litigant, a fund is
brought into existence, protected from diminution, or increased in
value, and the fund inures to the benefit of persons other than the
litigant, the litigant may have his legal expenses defrayed through the
application of fund assets. 2'
The common fund equitable exception, which has English ante-
cedents,'2 was first employed by the United States Supreme Court
to accomplish a just allocation of litigation expenses in Trustees v.
Greenough.2 ' The plaintiff was one of many holders of certain rail-
road bonds. The assets of a fund had been pledged to secure prospec-
tive payment of bond interest and installments upon principal. Plain-
tiff Vose, suing on behalf of all bondholders, alleged that the trustees
of the fund had made improper dispositions of fund property. His
action to have certain conveyances of fund property set aside was
successful, thereby partially restoring the fund and preventing its
further dissipation. The Supreme Court stated that unjust enrichment
could be avoided only by distributing Greenough's legal expenses
among all the recipients who benefited from the litigation, saying that
failure to shift fees
would not only be unjust to him [Vose], but it would give the other
parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair
advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself. . . .they
ought to contribute their due portion of the expenses which he has
fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the fund is the most
equitable way of securing such contribution. 3'
The federal courts have since utilized the common fund analysis
to support fee-shifting in many cases.' The Greenough opinion,'
'r Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967).
22 A fee award under the common fund equitable exception to the no-fee rule constitutes
fee-shifting because it operates to alter the normal incidence of legal expense. However, it
differs from bad faith fee-shifting in that the common fund fee award disperses legal expenses
among litigation beneficiaries rather than shifting those expenses to the adverse party as a
punitive measure. Thus common fund fee-shifting may properly be envisioned as "fee spread-
ing." For an extensive discussion of fee awards in common fund cases, see I S. SPEISER,
A'roRNEYs' FEES 395-456 (1973). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attor-
ney Fees from Funds, 87 HARv. L. Rev. 1597 (1974).
1 3 See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 & n. 2 (1939), and authorities
cited therein. See also Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th
Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
105 U.S. 527 (1881).
I' d. at 532.
2 See, e.g., United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738 (1931); Harrison v.
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as did numerous subsequent common fund opinions,' recognized
an agency relationship between the successful litigant and those
whose interest were served by the litigation. In Sprague v. Ticonic
National Bank,'34 a decision which foreshadowed the broadening of
the common fund exception during the 1960's,111 the Supreme Court
made clear that common fund fee-shifting is not limited to cases in
which the party to be indemnified had functioned in a representative
capacity. The Court's decision further demonstrated that the bringing
of a fund before the court is not an indispensable prerequisite of
common fund fee-shifting. The plaintiff in Sprague without purport-
ing to represent similarly situated persons, sued the receiver of a bank
in which she had deposited money. She obtained a lien upon the funds
in possession of the receiver, and the estoppel effect of that litigation
established the rights of other depositors to assured payment. The
Court invoked the common fund equitable exception to the no-fee
rule, saying:
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes a
fund available for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance
in making the fund liable for his costs in producing it. But when such
a fund is for all practical purposes created for the benefit of others,
the formalities of the litigation-the absence of an avowed class suit
or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than
through a decree-hardly touch the power of equity in doing justice
as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation. As in much
else that pertains to equitable jurisdiction, individualization in the
exercise of a discretionary power will alone retain equity as a living
system and save it from sterility."'
III. EXPANSION OF THE TRADITIONAL EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO
THE No-FEE RULE AND CREATION OF THE "PRIVATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL" EXCEPTION
As society becomes more complex and diversified, an increasing
Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Gibbs
v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965); Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (Ist Cir. 1959);
Walsh v. National Savings & Trust Co., 247 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Cannon v. Parker,
152 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 806 (1946); Crumb v. Ramish, 86 F.2d
362 (9th Cir. 1936).
" 105 U.S. at 533-35.
' See, e.g., Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311 (1897); Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 567
(1886).
"a 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
133 See notes 146-59 infra and accompanying text.
m 307 U.S. at 167.
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number of legal disputes involve issues whose resolution may have
extensive social impact. The effects of litigation can reach far beyond
the named parties. Cases of this type are often generically referred
to as "public interest litigation." Proliferation of public interest liti-
gation in recent years has been accompanied by a partial relaxation
of the standards for application of the traditional equitable excep-
tions to the no-fee rule resulting in the formulation of a third equita-
ble exception.
A. From "Bad Faith" to "Obduracy"
Much of the public interest litigation of the 1960's involved civil
rights issues, particularly desegregation of public schools. In some
school desegregation cases, the federal courts evinced a willingness
to adopt a variant of the traditional bad faith equitable exception.
Classic bad faith fee-shifting cases featured egregious misconduct or
intransigence by parties against whom attorney's fees were assessed,
with the courts focusing upon the wrongdoers' wilfullness. 137 Under
the modified bad faith standard, inquiry into subjective motivation
receives less emphasis, and the strength of two additional considera-
tions-the importance of the right in issue and the necessity of resort
to litigation for vindication of that right-became the keys to the
propriety of fee-shifting.
In Bell v. School Board38 the Fourth Circuit reversed a federal
district court's refusal to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who had
successfully sought injunctive relief against continued public school
racial discrimination. Although the school board's course of behavior
may have justified fee-shifting under the traditional bad faith excep-
tion, the Fourth Circuit did not invoke the traditional rubric. The
reversal was premised upon a
'long continued pattern of evasion and obstruction which included
not only the defendants' unyielding refusal to take any initiative,
thus casting a heavy burden on the children and their parents, but
their interposing a variety of administrative obstacles to thwart the
valid wishes of the plaintiff for a desegregated education. 139
In a case involving similar facts, the Eighth Circuit said that the
award of "substantial attorney fees should be considered" where
"well known constitutional guarantees continue to be ignored or
abridged and individual pupils are forced to resort to the courts for
"1 See cases cited in notes 116-18 supra.
'3 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
I d. at 500. "
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protection." 14 0
The shift in focus, at least in the school desegregation context,
from the defendant's motives to the necessity and importance of the
litigation itself was clearly demonstrated in Cato v. Parham.141 There
a federal district court, after noting the defendant's apparent good
faith in attempting to effect desegregation of public schools, nonethe-
less awarded attorney's fees to plaintiff. The court expressly acknowl-
edged that "whatever progress has been made in the direction of
desegregation . . . followed judicial prodding. 14 Thus, where deeply
cherished civil rights can be protected only by court action, the im-
portance of a defendant's actual intent pales; and it is the defendant's
mere failure to discharge a legal duty, regardless of subjective moti-
vation, which attains paramount significance.13 In some such cases
federal courts have characterized defendants as "obstinately obdur-
ate' 4' and avoided usage of the term "bad faith," thereby implicitly
signifying acceptance of less rigid standards for equitable fee-shifting.
B. From "Common Fund" to "Substantial Benefit"
The traditional common fund exception to the no-fee rule has
also undergone decisional modification. The classic common fund
cases 45 each involved the conferral of some monetarily quantifiable
benefit upon an identifiable class of persons. Yet it is the bare besto-
wal of benefit upon others by a litigant and the existence of some
means whereby a court is able to equitably distribute the costs of
litigation among those who are benefitted which form the heart of
fund fee-shifting; whether the benefit bestowed can be readily quanti-
fied in dollars and cents should not be a decisive consideration. The
principle which underlies fund fee-shifting is the familiar one that
1 Clark v. Board of Education, 369 F.2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1966).
"' Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968).
4 Id. at 1378.
, The First Circuit subsequently used an approach similar to that of the Cato decision
in a non-desegregation context. In McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), the
plaintiff had challenged his dismissal from a college teaching position. The school's board of
trustees had declined to furnish to plaintiff a statement of the reasons for its decision, as
required by judicial precedent. The board of trustees submitted such a statement, and the trial
court dismissed the action. The First Circuit thereafter upheld the dismissal but held that the
plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney's fees since he had been "forced to go to court to
obtain the statement of reasons to which he was constitutionally entitled." Id. at 1112. Thus it
was the necessity of resort to litigation in order to vindicate an important right, rather than
demonstration of classic bad faith by the board, which inspired the court's fee-shifting decision.
I" See, e.g., Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968). Dyer v.
Love, 307 F.Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
"I See cases cited in note 131 supra.
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unjust enrichment should be avoided, and the courts have recognized
that non-monetary "substantial benefit" created through litigation
can constitute the type of enrichment of others which warrants equi-
table fee-shifting.
The most important case wherein the fund fee-shifting rationale
was held to encompass the conferral of a "substantial benefit" was
Mills v. Electric A uto-Lite, Inc."' The plaintiffs, who were stockhold-
ers of Electric Auto-Lite Company at the time of its 1963 merger into
Merganthaler Linotype Company, sought dissolution of that merger.
Electric Auto-Lite management had solicited stockholders' votes in
favor of the proposed merger by means of a proxy statement which
announced that the Electric Auto-Lite board of directors advocated
approval of the merger. However, the proxy statement failed to dis-
close that Merganthaler Linotype, through its ownership of a major-
ity portion of Electric Auto-Lite's outstanding common stock, exer-
cised effective control of the latter corporation and that all eleven
Electric Auto-Lite directors "were nominees of Merganthaler and
were under the 'control and domination of Merganthaler.' "147 Plain-
tiffs therefore asserted that such nondisclosure rendered manage-
ment's proxy solicitation materially misleading and thus violative of
§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.148 The Supreme Court
agreed with plaintiffs' contention and remanded the case to the trial
court for determination of what mode of relief was appropriate under
the circumstances.149
The Court then proceeded to assess the propriety of an interim
award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs. Ironically, the attorney's fees
question had been interjected by the Justice Department as amicus
curiae rather than by the plaintiffs.150 The Court found that the litiga-
tion had generated a "substantial benefit" whose salutary impact
reached all Electric Auto-Lite stockholders. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the cost of such "corporate therapeutics" should be
equitably borne by all who are thereby benefitted, 1m and the fund fee-
" 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
"' Id. at 378. Although Merganthaler Linotype controlled the board of directors, its fifty-
four percent ownership of Electric Auto-Lite common stock was not sufficient to carry the
merger vote without the support of minority stockholders. Id. at 379.
1 S 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970). The proxy solicitation was also alleged to have violated SEC
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1972).
"' 396 U.S. at 389.
' See Comment, The Allocation ofA ttorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric A uto-Lite Co.,
38 U. CI. L. REv. 316, 324 & n. 46 (1971).
"1' 396 U.S. at 391-97. The Court stated:"[R]egardless of the relief granted, private stock-
holders' actions of this sort 'involve corporate therapeutics,' and furnish a benefit of all share-
holders . . ." Id. at 396 (footnote omitted). The "corporate therapeutics" language was
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shifting principle was held applicable, notwithstanding that the prod-
uct of plaintiffs' efforts defied monetary quantifications:
A primary judge-created exception has been to award expenses
where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit, usually on be-
half of a class, that benefits a group of others in the manner as
himself. . . . To allow the others to obtain full benefit from the
plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation ex-
penses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's ex-
pense. This suit presents such a situation. The dissemination of
misleading proxy solicitations was a "deceit practiced on the stock-
holders as a group," J. L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S., at 432, 84
S.Ct., at 1560, and the expenses of petitioners' lawsuit have been
incurred for the benefit of the corporation and the other sharehold-
ers. The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never
produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid
does not preclude an award based on this rationale. Although the
earliest cases recognizing a right to reimbursement involved litiga-
tion that produced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit
of a group, nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must bring
money into the courts as a prerequisite to the court's power to order
reimbursement of expenses.'
Approving the reasoning employed by other courts which had decreed
"reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a substan-
tial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible
an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among
them," 15 3 the Court held that an interim award of attorney's fees was
warranted.'54
The Supreme Court subsequently utilized the substantial benefit
adopted from the writings of Professor George Hornstein, who had much earlier advocated the
fee-shifting approach embraced by the Mills majority. See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The
"'Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658 (1956).
21 396 U.S. at 392 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
In Id. at 393-94. The courts of several states had previously accepted the substantial
benefit analysis as a valid ground for fee-shifting. The Court cited many of these state court
decisions, id. at 394-95 nn. 19-22, and approvingly quoted a leading state court case:
Where an action by a stockholder results in a substantial benefit to a corporation
he should recover his costs and expenses. . . . [A] substantial benefit must be some-
thing more than technical in its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result
which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and
interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection of an essential right
to the stockholder's interest.
Id. at 396, quoting Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n., 257 Minn. 362, 366-
67, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426-27 (1960).
Im 396 U.S. at 396-97.
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approach to support fee-shifting in a case involving labor union "ther-
apeutics." In Hall v. Cole,155 the Court affirmed the award of attor-
ney's fees to a plaintiff who had been unjustly stripped of his union
membership. At a union meeting, the plaintiff had proposed that the
members adopt a resolution condemning union officials for misman-
agement. Expulsion of plaintiff from the union ensued. Alleging that
his ouster from the union constituted a violation of § 101(a)(2) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,156 plaintiff suc-
cessfully sought reinstatement of his union membership, damages for
lost wages and reimbursement for attorney's fees. In holding that the
lower court's discretionary fee award was proper, the majority opin-
ion reasoned that plaintiff
by vindicating his own right of free speech guaranteed by § 101 (a)(2)
• * * necessarily rendered a substantial service to his union as an
institution and to all of its members. When a union member is
disciplined for the exercise of any of the rights protected by Title I
[of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act], the
rights of all members of the union are threatened. . . .[A]s in
Mills, reimbursement of respondent's attorney's fees out of the
union treasury simply shifts the costs of litigation to "the class that
has benefitted from them . ... "I"
Thus Hall v. Cole, like Mills, stands for the proposition that the fund
fee-shifting rationale retains its doctrinal forcefulness where litigation
creates a substantial benefit for an ascertainable class, notwithstand-
ing that such benefit defies monetary valuation." 8 The lower federal
courts have also applied this fee-shifting principle in cases having
therapeutic impact upon institutions other than labor unions and
business corporations. 59
C. Emergence of a New Equitable Exception to the No-Fee Rule
The modification of traditional standards for discretionary fee-
412 U.S. 1 (1973).
29 U.S.C. § 412(a)(2) (1970).
"17 412 U.S. at 8-9; accord, Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 466 F.2d 424,429 (D.C.
Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). The Fourth Circuit had long ago presaged the
recognition of labor union therapeutics as a substantial benefit capable of justifying fee-shifting
in a case wherein the fee award was primarily grounded upon the bad faith equitable exception
to the no-fee rule. See Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951).
"s These cases, particularly Mills, are amenable to a somewhat broader reading. See notes
192-200 infra and accompanying text.
"I~ See, e.g., Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Callahan v.
Wallace, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972); Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972); Bright v.
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington Stock Exch., 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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shifting supplied a foundation for the formulation of a third equitable
exception to the no-fee rule. The expansive judicial attitudes revealed
by the opinions in such cases as Cato v. Parham and Mills ultimately
led the federal courts to fashion a new fee-shifting doctrine. Liberali-
zation of the traditional equitable exceptions received its stimulus
from heightened judicial attention to several interrelated considera-
tions-the qualitative nature of the legal rights in issue,"' the necess-
ity for seeking protection of those rights through the courts,161 and
the widespread therapeutic consequences of particular pieces of litiga-
tion.112 Recognition of the pertinence of these considerations to the
equitable allocation of attorney's fees, along with such kindred fac-
tors as the huge expense of litigating certain types of civil actions6 3
and the unavailability of damage recovery in such actions, 64 spurred
development of the "private attorney general" equitable exception to
the no-fee rule. 65
1" See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (noting "the stress placed
by Congress on the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage"); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (involving "a policy that Congress considered
of the highest priority"). See also Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947, 948 (5th Cir. 1972);
McEnteggart v. Catalda, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1st Cir. 1971); Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134(7th Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683,
686 (D. Minn. 1971); Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (E.D. Ark), affd, 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968).
"' See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1st Cir. 1971) ("plaintiff was forced
to go to court"); Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (E.D. Ark.), affd, 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968) (progress in desegregation effort only after "judicial prodding"). See also Rolfe
v. Board of Educ., 391 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th
Cir. 1963); Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974, 987 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
I I See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-97 (1970); authorities cited
in note 159 supra. See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th
Cir. 1970); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970).
11 See, e.g. Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1966), where the court
mentioned the "crushing expense of enforcing. . . constitutionally accorded rights." In litiga-
tion involving issues of broad public impact, defendants are likely to be public or private
institutions with access to substantial financial and legal resources and with keen interest in
continuing challenged activity, while private plaintiffs, though possessing equal or greater
ardor, may find the financial burdens of extended legal battle extreme. Cf. Cole v. Hall, 462
F.2d 777, 780-81 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 412 U.S. 1 (1973). As an example of the severe financial
burden of protracted public interest litigation, the expense of litigating Brown v. Board of
Education, which was decided two inflationary decades ago, exceeded $200,000. 110 CONG.
REC. 6541 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
... See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
" The term "private attorney general" has long been used in reference to private parties
who serve the public interest through legal action. The term was coined in the context of a
dispute over standing to litigate, see Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), and was first used in the fee-shifting context in Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
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Private attorney general fee-shifting is predicated upon the desir-
ability, in some situations, of encouraging socially beneficial litiga-
tion by enhancing access to the adjudicative process. The fundamen-
tal premise is that the judiciary, through its discretionary power to
make fee awards, can and should mitigate financial impediments to
the institution of civil actions which promote the public good.'66 As
will be seen, the private attorney general exception did not surpass
its infancy; the doctrine's parameters, potentially quite broad, were
never definitively described. Yet it is clear that the private attorney
general exception, although it was the culmination of expansion of
the two traditional equitable exceptions, differed qualitatively from
other forms of judicial fee-shifting. Private attorney general fee-
shifting was not directly related to the conduct of the party against
whom the opponent's attorney's fees were assessed. Furthermore, in
contradistinction to the common fund and substantial benefit fee-
shifting rationale, the private attorney general exception did not rest
upon a court's ability to distribute a successful litigant's expenses
among the class of beneficiaries of the litigation. 6 7 A closer look at
the private attorney general exception will cause its significance as a
device for the attainment of "public therapeutics" to come into focus.
I" See generally Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971). One
writer briefly described the private attorney general fee-shifting theory:
A basis for awarding attorney's fees frequently employed in recent cases is that
a successful litigant can sometimes act as a "private attorney general" by detecting
violations of statutes and encouraging compliance through private action. In such
cases where the court is seeking to promote private enforcement, awarding attorney's
fees reduces the barrier to suit created by high litigation costs. Removing disincen-
tives to sue is particularly important when the attorney's fees may exceed the poten-
tial damage award, as in cases seeking injunctive relief.
Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411, 413 (1973)
(footnotes omitted).
I" Unlike fund fee-shifting, fee awards under the private attorney general exception consti-
tues "true" fee-shifting. That is, the private attorney general exception does not depend upon
the court's ability to spread the expense of litigation among the recipients of its salutary effects
by assesing the victor's counsel fees against the losing party, the losing party may be deemed a
litigation beneficiary in the sense that everyone benefits when the public interest is served, but
a private attorney general fee award need not operate to distribute the fees among an ascertain-
able class of litigation beneficiaries. But cf King and Plater, supra note 32, at 52-53. In this
regard, private attorney general fee awards more closely resemble those made pursuant to the
bad faith exception, and the newest equitable exception therefore has more widely-ranging
applicability than the fund approach. Elements of all three equitable exceptions to the no-fee
rule may coalesce in a single piece of litigation; see, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D.
Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), but the private attorney general exception is not dependent
upon the punishment or prevention of unjust enrichment bases of traditional equitable fee-
shifting. See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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IV. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EQUITABLE EXCEPTION TO
THE NO-FEE RULE
A. Doctrinal Underpinnings: The Supreme Court's Opinions in
Newman and Mills
Only the lower federal courts explicitly acknowledged accept-.
ance of the private attorney general exception to the no-fee rule. The
federal district and circuit courts announced, refined and imple-
mented the newest equitable fee-shifting doctrine6 ' without the ex-
press approval of the United States Supreme Court.'69 Nevertheless,
much of the conceptual framework for lower court formulation of the
private attorney general exception was supplied by the Supreme
Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. 170 and in the Mills
decision.
In Piggie Park, the plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief, alleging
that defendant had violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964'17
by practicing racial discrimination in the operation of its restaurants.
Congress expressly provided authorization for discretionary fee-
shifting in cases involving discriminatory conduct proscribed by Title
11.172 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that an award of attorney's
fees pursuant to this provision was warranted only where the defen-
dant had acted "not in good faith,"' 17 thereby reading the statute as
merely incorporating the traditional bad faith exception to the no-fee
,, See, e.g. Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cit. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899
(6th Cir. 1974) vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Brandenburger v. Thompson,
494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 955 (1973); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453
F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cit. 1972);
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949
(D. Hawaii 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972); NAACP v. Allen,
340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 942 (1972). For excellent discussions of some of the leading lower federal court private
attorney general fee-shifting cases, see Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 326-31; Note, A warding
Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General", Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation
in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L. J. 733, 742-55 (1973).
169 Until this year, the Supreme Court never directly confronted the propriety of fee-
shifting under the private attorney general exception. In its most recent pre-1975 reference to
that exception, the Court stated: "This 'private attorney general' rationale has not been
squarely before this Court and it is not so now; nor do we intend to imply any view either on
the validity or scope of that doctrine." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. International
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 130 (1974).
t7o 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970), which proscribes discriminatory practices by restaurants
affecting interstate commerce.
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) ("... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevail-
ing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... ").
I Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967).
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rule.'74 The Supreme Court disagreed. Preferring a less rigid con-
struction, the Court held that the permissive fee-shifting language of
the statute required that a successful Title II plaintiff "should ordi-
narily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust.' 175
The importance of Piggie Park cannot be gleaned from the
Court's holding, which could have been limited to a narrow range of
circumstances. Rather, the true significance of the Court's decision
may be discerned only by considering the temporal juxtaposition of
Piggie Park to Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.'76
and by examining the language of the short Piggie Park per curiam
opinion.
In Fleischmann, decided only a year before Piggie Park, the
Supreme Court had taken a "stunning step backward"' 77 in the area
of equitable fee-shifting. The defendants had deliberately infringed
the plaintiffs' trademark rights in violation of the Lanham Act. 78 The
trial court, following a large body of federal case law, 179 held that
plaintiffs should recover reasonable attorney's fees. The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed on the attorney's fees issue, 8° and the Supreme Court
affirmed. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren noted that the
Lanham Act prescribes "intricate" and "meticulously detailed" rem-
edies, among which there is no authorization for fee awards., Then,
explaining that other federal statutes do provide for fee-shifting,8 2 the
Chief Justice reasoned that congressional silence with respect to allo-
cation of attorney's fees precluded judicial fee-shifting in Lanham
Act trademark infringement actions.'
"I In effect, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the express grant of fee-shifting discretion to
be a mere restatement of the court's inherent power to award attorney's fees, neither augment-
ing that power nor providing significant direction concerning its use. Id., accord, Bell v. Ala-
matt Motel, 243 F. Supp. 472 (D. Miss. 1966).
M 390 U.S. at 402.
176 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
' Comment, The Allocation ofAttorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 38
U. Cii. L. REv. 316, 320 (1971).
179 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970).
17 See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 325 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1963). Wolfe v. National Lead
Co., 272 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 243
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965); Century Distilling Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140
(3d Cir. 1953).
" Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 359 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1966).
"' 386 U.S. at 719.
"n Id. at 720-21. The court cited numerous statutes, many of which are cited in notes 96
& 97 supra. Id. at 721 n. 17.
10 When a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly
provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily
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Fleischmann generated a "chilling effect on the lower federal
courts" which was not limited to trademark litigation.18 The
Fleischmann opinion offered a general endorsement of the no-fee
rule"' and indicated that judicial fee-shifting was proper only under
severely limited circumstances.18 The restrictive tone of Fleischmann
arrested a nascent trend among the lower federal courts toward liber-'
alization of equitable fee-shifting.187 Thus the Piggie Park decision,
even though involving a statute which permitted fee-shifting, reflected
a shift in the Court's attitude toward awards of attorney's fees:
"Piggie Park broadened the permissible scope of fee granting by
interpreting a discretionary provision for attorney's fees as a virtual
command always to award fees to a successful plaintiff, and thereby
signalled a change in the Court's position toward a more liberal
approach." ' This shift in attitude served to dissipate the chill of
Fleischmann.
Beyond merely resuscitating the trend toward more expansive
applications of the traditional equitable exceptions to the no-fee rule,
Piggie Park contained the seeds of a new fee-shifting doctrine. The
Court buttressed its decision by enumerating several factors which
made Piggie Park a particularly strong case for an award of attor-
ney's fees:
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have
to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad
be implied. . . .Congress ...has selectively provided [for fee awards] .. .in
connection with various other statutory causes of action. But several attempts to
introduce such a provision into the Lanham Act have failed of enactment. We
therefore must conclude that Congress intended § 35 of the Lanham Act to mark
the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases under the Act. A
judicially created compensatory remedy in addition to the express statutory remedies
is inappropriate in this context.
Id. at 720-21 (citations and footnotes omitted). In lone dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart ascribed
much less significance to the absence of express provision for fee-shifting. Id. at 721-23 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting).
I" Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
38 U. Cni. L. REv. 316, 321 (1971).
1 386 U.S. at 717-18.
"8 The Court acknowledged that fee-shifting is proper "in a civil contempt action occa-
sioned by willful disobedience of a court order," id. at 718, and "where a plaintiff traced or
created a common fund for the benefit of others as well as himself," id. at 719. The Court also
added that "recognized exceptions to the general rule were not, however, developed in the
context of statutory causes of action for which the legislature had prescribed intricate reme-
dies," id., thereby further limiting the ambit of the narrow exceptions it had described.
"I See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966); Bell v. School Bd.,
321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
"I8 Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 319-20.
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compliance with the law. A Title II suit is thus private in form only.
When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title, he cannot recover
damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself
alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating a policy
that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plain-
tiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorney's fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public inter-
est by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.)89
The factors stressed by the Court-necessity of private litigation,
availability of injunctive relief only, and existence of a strong con-
gressional policy in favor of enforcement-are not exclusive to ac-
tions under Title II. Such factors are characteristic of a variety of
civil actions, and the lower federal courts have taken ample note of
this fact. t9 '
As previously explained, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. was a
landmark decision because of the Court's acceptance therein of the
substantial benefit variant of the traditional common fund exception
to the no-fee rule.' It is undeniable that the fund fee-shifting ration-
ale served as the essential predicate for the Mills decision; the Court's
opinion concluded with the statement that "[t]o award attorneys' fees
in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in establishing a cause
of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but
to impose them upon the class that has benefitted from them...
However, closer scrutiny of the factual situation in Mills suggests
that the decision is susceptible of an even broader interpretation than
that revealed by a literal reading of the Court's opinion. The Supreme
Court did something more than simply extend the fund fee-shifting
rationale to new ground. As one writer has observed, "Mills actually
announced a hybrid doctrine with aspects of both the equitable fund
and private attorney general exceptions."'9
Fund fee-shifting involves the allocation of attorney's fees "as
between solicitor and client,"9 4 such that the expenses of litigation
are borne by its beneficiaries. Under the fund rationale, the burden
" 390 U.S. at 401-02.
'" See, e.g., cases cited in note 168 supra.
m See the prior discussion of Mills in notes 146-54 supra and accompanying text.
112 396 U.S. at 396-97.
m Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58
CORN. L. Rev. 1222, 1237 (1973).
"I Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 165 (1939) (citing numerous English
authorities). Under the fund rationale fees are shifted in a manner such that persons whose
interests have been protected by the efforts of counsel ultimately bear the expense of that
protection. Thus the fund approach does not result in "true" fee-shifting. See note 167 supra.
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of attorney's fees is shifted from a beneficient litigant, but they are
not shifted to the adverse party as adverse party. Yet the Mills result
may be seen as entailing "true" fee-shifting rather than the distribu-
tion of litigation expense among all recipients of benefit. This view
stems from the nature of the beneficiary class in Mills. Straightfor-
ward application of the fund fee-shifting theory to the Mills facts
rests, at least implicitly, upon the tenuous assumption that the class
of beneficiaries was composed of all Electric Auto-Lite stockholders.
Thus one commentator has contended that
the assertion that Mills does not involve true fee shifting fails to
make sense in light of the fact situation. Here over fifty per cent of
the stockholders were opposed to enforcement of the Securities
Exchange Act regulations. Where the majority of the stockholders
has an interest opposed to the litigation, the payment of fees by the
corporation represents true fee transfer.95
There can be little doubt that the self-interests of the Electric
Auto-Lite majority were disserved by the Mills litigation. Neverthe-
less, they did receive benefit as a result of plaintiff's efforts-the
benefit, accruing to all stockholders and all citizens, of enforcement
of the federal securities laws. Indeed, the Court stated that the sub-
stantial benefit generated by litigation of the proxy violation question
emanated from "the stress placed by Congress on fair and informed
corporate suffrage." '96 Viewed in this perspective, 9 ' Mills reinforced
the emphasis which Piggie Park had attached to vindication of con-
gressional policy as a favorable determinant of fee-shifting.98 Addi-
"I Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316, 333 (1971).
" 396 U.S. at 396.
It Many federal courts have chosen to read Mills in this light. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973); Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1972); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D.
Cal. 1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669, 670 (D.D.C. 1973); Sims
v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). But see Bradley v.
School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
"I Fund fee-shifting involves the distribution of litigation expense among those benefitted
thereby. Since the majority of Electric Auto-Lite's stockholders were averse to the litigation,
the stockholders, as a whole, were not directly benefitted by the Mills plaintiffs' success. Yet,
because the fee award was assessed against the corporation, all stockholders shared in the cost
of the plaintiffs' efforts. The majority stockholders may be said to have reaped benefit through
triumph of the rule of law, but the same type of benefit extends to all who are affected by the
securities laws. Therefore, the Mills fee award did not effect the precise matching of cost to
benefit which is the hallmark of classic fund fee-shifting. See notes 126-36 supra and accompa-
nying text. Thus the Mills result cannot receive its justification from the application of pure
fund theory. The "true" fee-shifting of Mills is instead explained by the law enforcement
value-the public interest value-of the litigation. See generally Comment, The Allocation oJ
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tionally, Mills went beyond Piggie Park, augmenting the Court's
retreat from the retrograde thrust of Fleischmann. The Mills Court
cursorily distinguished Fleischmann"9 and had no difficulty finding
a sufficiently strong congressional policy to justify the award of fees
to private litigants enforcing § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. This aspect of the Mills decision is particularly noteworthy
because Congress had made no provision for fee awards in § 14(a)
cases and, in fact, had not even expressly authorized a private right
of action under § 14(a).111 Thus, in tandem, Piggie Park and Mills can
be read to comprise the conceptual foundation for a new equitable
fee-shifting doctrine with principal importance accorded to the mag-
nitude of public benefit resultant from the activity of certain private
litigants. The task of synthesizing those two Supreme Court decisions
and thereby fashioning the private attorney general exception to the
no-fee rule was undertaken by numerous lower federal courts.
B. Federal District Courts and Courts of Appeals: Fee Awards to
Private Attorneys General
1. The Private Attorney General Exception in Racial
Discrimination Cases.
The private attorney general equitable fee-shifting doctrine was
first articulated in a series of cases involving racial discrimination
during the early 1970's. Of these cases," 1 it was Lee v. Southern
Home Sites Corp.,"'2 which first breathed real life into the private
attorney general doctrine. Southern Home Sites Corporation was a
Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 316, 326-34 (1971).
I" The remedial provisions of the 1934 Act are far different from those of the
Lanham Act. . . .Since Congress in the Lanham Act had "meticulously detailed
the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been
infringed," the Court in Fleischmann concluded that the express remedial provisions
were intended "to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in
cases arising under the Act." .. ..By contrast, we cannot fairly infer from the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe the courts' power to grant
appropriate remedies. . . .The Act makes no provision for private recovery for a
violation of § 14(a), other than a declaration of "voidness"....
396 U.S. at 391 (citations omitted). The Court made no mention that Congress had expressly
provided for fee awards in §§ 9(e) and 18(a) of the 1934 Act, a potentially telling factor under
the tenor of the Fleischmann opinion. See note 183 supra.
2" The private right of action under § 14(a) was implied in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
"I See Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852
(Ist Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1972); NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex.
1971); Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1971).
1 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1972).
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real estate development firm in Mississippi. In order to stimulate the
sale of lots in "Ocean Beach Estates," one of its developments,
Southern Home Sites mailed numerous form letters which offered
each addressee the opportunity to purchase a home site for a fraction
of the purportedly usual $600.00 selling price. The letters stipulated
that only whites were eligible to avail themselves of the offer con-
tained therein. The plaintiff Lee, who was black, had received one of
the form letters. He tendered $49.50, the form letter offer price, to
Southern Home Sites in an attempt to purchase a lot. Southern
Home Sites refused to consummate the transaction. Lee, alleging
that the corporation had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982,203 sued for in-
junctive relief and requested reimbursement of his attorney's fees.
The district court enjoined further racially discriminatory sales
practices by Southern Home Sites and ordered that Lee be permitted
to purchase a lot. However, the court declined to make a fee award. 2 4
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision to not shift fees.
Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, opined that, in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,25
the illegality of the defendant's conduct was sufficiently well estab-
lished that Southern Home Sites demonstrated bad faith by prolong-
ing the litigation.2 0 But that observation was interjected only "in
passing" and was not the basis for the court's fee-shifting decision.
Instead, Judge Wisdom found a "broader ground" upon which to rest
the court's holding that "attorney's fees are part of the effective
remedy a court should fashion to carry out the congressional policy
embodied in section 1982. ' '217
In elucidating the "broader ground" for fee-shifting in Lee-that
the plaintiff had functioned as a private attorney general-Judge
Wisdom initially recounted the teaching of the Alfred H. Mayer case.
He stated that the Supreme Court had therein held that § 1982
"barred private racial discrimination in the sale of housing and that
federal courts should fashion an effective remedy to enforce the rights
declared by Congress in the Statute."2 8 Judge Wisdom then turned
to Mills. He first conceded that, due to the language employed by the
20 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
204 The district court judge declined to make a fee award on the ground that the bad faith
exception was not applicable. 444 F.2d at 144.
202 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Supreme Court therein held
that § 1982's prohibition of racial discrimination in property transactions applies to private
parties as well as public entities.
21 444 F.2d at 144.
7 Id.
200 Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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Court, the Mills decision was ostensibly grounded upon the fund fee-
shifting rationale. But he then explained that, because the Mills litiga-
tion benefitted the stockholders of all corporations,29 another ration-
ale underlay the decision to award attorney's fees in that case. He
interpreted Mills to represent recognition of the need to encourage
the furtherance of congressional policy through private litigation:
Therefore the Court's decision is better understood as resting heav-
ily on its acknowledgement of 'overriding considerations,' that pri-
vate suits are necessary to effectuate congressional policy and that
awards of attorney's fees are necessary to encourage private liti-
gants to intimate such suits. 20
Having given such a broad reading to Mills, Judge Wisdom then
stated that "here as in Mills there is a strong congressional policy
behind the rights declared in section 1982."2' 1 To illumine the
strength of the policy behind § 1982, which was enacted in 1866,
Judge Wisdom focused upon more recently enacted federal legisla-
tion of a similar nature.212 He found that other statutes which em-
brace the policies embodied in § 1982, including the Fair Housing
Law,213 make express provision for fee-shifting. Judge Wisdom rea-
soned that
in fashioning an effective remedy for the rights declared by Con-
gress one hundred years ago, courts should look not only to the
policy of the enacting Congress but also to the policy embodied in
closely related legislation. Courts work interstitially in an area such
as this.24
This exercise in statutory comparison led to the conclusion that
the effective remedy for securing the rights declared in § 1982 should
include the award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs such as
provided in the Fair Housing Law. . .The same policies support-
ing Congress' provision for attorney's fees in that statute apply to
I" The Court reasoned that the situation was not too different from the typical
derivative action, where it is appropriate for the corporation to pay the attorney's
fees because the corporation receives a benefit from the suit. But the benefit that the
court focused on is conferred on all shareholders in the country, and therefore
established derivative action considerations do not seem to apply to the situation.
Id. at 145.
210 Id.
211 Id. Judge Wisdom added that "[a]warding attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs would
facilitate the enforcement of that policy through private litigation." Id.
212 Id. at 146-47.
213 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). Judge Wisdom also mentioned two of the fee-shifting
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1970).
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fair housing suits under § 1982.14
Finally, Judge Wisdom presented a discussion of Piggie Park as
further reinforcement of the fee-shifting decision in Lee. He found
that the considerations marshalled by the Piggie Park Court in sup-
port of its holding were paralleled in Lee. In particular, he empha-
sized that "against private discrimination § 1982 is today 'enforceable
only by private parties acting on their own initiative,' "1216 and that
Piggie Park had stressed that Title II enforcement must come
through private action.217 Thus the Fifth Circuit felt that the concep-
tual similarities of Piggie Park and Lee were far more compelling
than the difference in language of the statutes invoked in those two
cases:
We think the factors relied on in Piggie Park in interpreting the
provision for awarding attorney's fees apply also to suits under §
1982. The policy against discrimination in the sale or rental of
property is equally strong. The statute, under present judicial devel-
opment, depends entirely on private enforcement. Although damn-
ages may be available,. . . in many cases there may be no damages
or damages difficult to prove. To ensure that individual litigants are
willing to act as "private attorneys general" to effectuate the public
purposes of the statute, attorney's fees should be . . . available
218
The brilliant exposition of the private attorney general doctrine
in Lee became the touchstone for fee-shifting in many cases concern-
ing racial discrimination. In Knight v. Auciello,11 the First Circuit
accepted the reasoning of Lee, holding that the successful § 1982
plaintiff therein was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The
defendant had discriminated against the black plaintiff by "know-
ingly [using a] false pretext in refusing to lease an apartment.""22 The
district court rendered a damage judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
but denied his request for fee-shifting. In reversing the lower court's
disposition of the attorney's fees issue, the First Circuit said:
The violation of an important public policy may involve little by
way of actual damages, so far as a single individual is concerned,
or little in comparison with the cost of vindication, as the case at
"1 444 F.2d at 146.
215 Id. at 147.
218 Id. at 146, quoting Jones V. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968).
217 444 F.2d at 147.
218 Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added).
219 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
220 Id. at 852.
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bar illustrates. . . .In such instances public policy may suggest an
award of costs that will remove the burden from the shoulders of
the plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public right. We regard this as
such a case.22'
The principle announced in Lee is also directly applicable to civil
actions concerning unlawful racially discriminatory conduct in areas
other than real property transactions. For example, the Fifth Circuit
in Cooper v. Allen 22 applied the private attorney general doctrine to
an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1981.223 The plaintiff had
been denied a position as a golf professional due to racial bias. And
in NAACP v. Allen,24 a case instituted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,21
the court awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs who had served as
private attorneys general by vigorously challenging practices which
operated to prevent the employment of blacks by the Alabama State
Patrol.
2. Private Attorney General Fee-Shifting in Cases Involving Other
Substantive Rights.
The private attorney general exception to the no-fee rule, as
articulated in Lee and its progeny, is not limited in application to civil
actions instituted to curtail racial discrimination. The doctrine has
been invoked in actions involving a wide-ranging variety of substan-
tive rights. The lower federal courts have utilized private attorney
general fee-shifting to encourage the enforcement of constitutionally
protected civil rights by private litigants.
In Sims v. Amos, 22 a § 1983 case, a three-judge district court
awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs who had sued to redress their
deprivation of equal suffrage. The court found that "although the
1970 dicennial [sic] census demonstrated that the Alabama Legisla-
ture was egregiously malapportioned, the Legislature unyielding re-
fused to perform the mandate imposed on it by both the State and
Federal Constitutions." '  But despite the defendants' exhibition of
bad faith, the court chose to ground its fee-shifting decision on the
private attorney general doctrine.228 Speaking of private litigants who
12 Id. at 853 (footnote omitted).
n 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972).
r 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
22 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
23 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
22 Id. at 694.
2, [A] finding of bad faith is not always a prerequisite to the taxing of attorneys'
fees against defendants, and in this case, despite the availability of that ground, the
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contribute to the realization of congressional policy, the court as-
serted that "under such circumstances, the award of fees loses much
of its discretionary character and becomes a part of the effective
remedy a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits...
and to carry out congressional policy. 229 However, unlike the situa-
tion in Lee and kindred racial discrimination cases, the Sims court
did not have the benefit of recent legislation through which it might
discern the strength of congressional policy regarding the defendants'
violation. The Sims court nevertheless found that the requisite policy
in favor of enforcement emanated from the essential nature of the
right which plaintiffs had vindicated:
The present case clearly falls among those meant to be encouraged
under the principles articulated in Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. and
Mills, and expanded upon in Southern Home Sites. . . .The bene-
fit accruing to the plaintiffs' class cannot be overemphasized. No
other right is more basic to the integrity of our democratic society
than is the right plaintiffs assert here to free and equal suffrage..In
addition, congressional policy strongly favors the vindication of fed-
eral rights violated under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and,
more specifically, the protection of the right to a nondiscriminatory
franchise.23
Since the plaintiffs had undertaken costly litigation to safeguard a
fundamental right suffused with strong congressional policy, the
court determined that such private legal action should be encouraged
and that, therefore, "an award of attorneys' fees is essential. '23'
The language of Sims indicates that the court felt constrained
to find a strong congressional policy in order to justify its implemen-
tation of the private attorney general doctrine. Of course, the exist-
ence of a strong congressional policy favoring enforcement of the
particular right in issue was an important constituent of the fee-
shifting approach used in Lee. 2 The Fifth Circuit's confirmation
that such a policy exists with respect to § 1982 actions was facilitated
in Lee by the enactment of related federal legislation which included
Court has decided to base its award on far broader considerations of equity.
In instituting the case sub judice, plaintiffs have served in the capacity of "pri-
vate attorneys general" . . . . If, pursuant to this action, plaintiffs have benefited
their class and have effectuated a strong congressional policy, they are entitled to
attorneys' fees regardless of defendants' good or bad faith.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
2n Id. (citations omitted).
m Id. (citations omitted).
23' Id. at 695.
232 See notes 211-15 supra and accompanying text.
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express authorization of fee-shifting. However, there are no recent
federal enactments which courts may use to explore, by comparison
and analogy, the strength of congressional policy regarding many of
the types of litigation which arise under § 1983. Nevertheless, it has
been suggested that examination of congressional policy is unneces-
sary in assessing the propriety of private attorney general fee-shifting
in "constitutional litigation, ' ' 1 3 and, by and large, the lower federal
courts conformed to this view in § 1983 cases subsequent to Sims.
Thus, for example, in recently affirming a private attorney general
fee award in a § 1983 case, the Sixth Circuit perfunctorily observed
that the plaintiffs, "in bringing this action, vindicated constitutional
rights strongly favored by congressional policy," and the court of-
fered no further discussion of the point.234 Other courts disposed of
the "congressional policy" matter in a similarly summary manner or
declined to mention it at all in § 1983 fee-shifting cases.235
An additional area in which lower federal courts demonstrated
receptivity to the private attorney general doctrine as a basis for fee-
shifting was that of environmental litigation. The seminal case in this
area was La Raza Unida v. Volpe.2 13 The plaintiffs in La Raza had
qbtained injunctive relief against continued construction of California
Highway Project 238, which had failed to comply with the prescrip-
tions of several federal statutes.27 Thereafter the plaintiffs moved for
assessment of their litigation expenses as costs against several of the
defendants. District Judge Peckham, thoughtfully exploring the three
extant grounds for equitable fee-shifting, determined that neither the
2 Attorneys' fees ought to be awarded, as a matter of course, in all cases in
which the successful party vindicates civil or constitutional rights. In all such cases,
the successful litigant is, indeed, acting as a "private attorney general" vindicating
rights of the "highest priority." . . . In the case of constitutional litigation,. . . the
courts lack legislative determination of the importance of the policies vindicated.
However, there is no need for legislative determination of the importance of constitu-
tional policies. That is one determination the courts can make themselves, without
fear of engaging in wholesale revision of the general American practice on fees,
because of the unique position of the Constitution.
Falcon, A ward ofA ttorneys' Fees in Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation, 33 MARYLAND
L. REv. 379, 419 (1973) (footnote omitted).
1' Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 889, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct.
1985 (1975).
21 See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974) vacated and
remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974);
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp.
1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
21 In undertaking construction of Project 238, the defendants violated federal enactments
dealing with both environmental protection and housing displacement and relocation assis-
tance; none of the statutes involved contained fee-shifting provisions. Id. at 95-96.
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bad faith nor fund exception was applicable but that plaintiffs were
nonetheless entitled to an award of fees for having served as private
attorneys general.
Placing primary reliance upon Lee, Judge Peckham explained
the private attorney general exception as follows:
The rule briefly states is that whenever there is nothing in a statu-
tory scheme which might be interpreted as precluding it, a "private
attorney-general" should be awarded attorneys' fees when he has
effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has benefited a
large class of people, and where further the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award essen-
tial."'
Having announced this tripartite test, Judge Peckham discussed each
element in turn. First, stating that "[flew public policies are accorded
the weight and priority of those present in this lawsuit," he quoted
several sources indicating that congressional policy favored the objec-
tives and results of plaintiffs' action.29 He then turned to the second
element of the test he had formulated and found that "plaintiffs have
conferred various benefits on numerous people in varying degree,"
nothing that although the salutary impact of plaintiffs; efforts was
felt most directly by local residents, "all of society" received some
measure of benefit.2 14 Finally, Judge Peckham found that the third
requisite of his test-the necessity and financial burden of.private
enforcement-was met in La Raza. Observing that "[tihe only public
entities that might have brought suit in this case were named as
defendants . . . and vigorously opposed plaintiffs' contentions, ' 2 ' he
stated that awesome financial disincentives inhibit the institution of
such actions by private parties. 42
s Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 99. Judge Peckham offered a quotation from the concurring opinion of Mr.
Jstice Black in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 421 (1971), as
proof that public policy strongly favors protection of the environment. With respect to the
strength of the policy which favors relocation assistance, Judge Peckham merely quoted the
policy statements of two statutes, 23 U.S.C. § 501 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 4621 (1970), dealing
with relocation of persons displaced by federal programs. This aspect of the La Raza opinion
has been criticized on the ground that Judge Peckham failed to demonstrate that unusually
strong congressional policies underlay the statutes enforced by the plaintiffs. See Note,
A warding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private
Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733, 754 (1973).
240 57 F.R.D. at 100.
21, Id. at 101.
242 Only a private party could have been expected to bring this litigation, and
yet a private party is least able to bear the tremendous economic burdens. To force
the private litigants to bear their own costs here would be tantamount to a penalty,
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Judge Peckahm's analysis of the La Raza situation revealed
that, in essence, the litigation undertaken by the plaintiffs was of a
type which warranted encouragement and that an acceptable method
of encouraging such actions is to minimize the financial obstacles
confronting private litigants by allowing them to recover attorney's
fees as costs. The same approach was adopted by other lower federal
courts which authorized fee awards to private attorneys general who
had contested unlawful abuses of environmental quality. 4 3
3. Standards for Private Attorney General Fee-Shifting
In many of the cases in which the private attorney general excep-
tion was applied, fee-shifting could have been justified by reliance
upon one or both of the older equitable exceptions to the no-fee
rule. "' However, in other cases, courts invoked the private attorney
general doctrine to support fee awards after expressly holding that
neither of the traditional fee-shifting grounds were applicable.245 Thus
it is clear that in the contemplation of the lower federal courts which
embraced it, the private attorney general doctrine did constitute a
distinct, integral exception to the no-fee rule. The existence of addi-
tional factors in a particular case may have buttressed a court's deci-
sion to make a fee award, but satisfactions of the requirement of the
private attorney general doctrine was, without more, sufficient to
justify such a decision.
The precise nature of the standards for application of the private
attorney exception is much less clear. It is not possible to ascertain a
definitive catalogue of the doctrine's components, nor can any univer-
sal rule of applicability be distilled through a synthesis of the deci-
and it seems somewhat inequitable to punish litigants who have policed those charged
with implementing and following Congressional mandates.
Id.
I2U See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.) rev'd sub nona.,
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (Ist Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp.
834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973).
2 See, e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972);
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). In some cases in
which the elements of more than one equitable ground have been present, the fee-shifting
grounds have not been made entirely clear. See, e.g., Milburn v. Huecker, 500 F.2d 1279 (6th
Cir. 1974); Rainey v. Jackson St. College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973).
24 See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom., Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975). La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57
F.R.D. 94, 97 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See also Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1401 (5th Cir. 1975);
Jinks v. Mays, 350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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sions in which private attorney general fee-shifting has been dis-
cussed. Various lower federal courts, in describing the requisites of
the private attorney general exception, stressed one or more of a
variety of factors. Among those factors were strength of congres-
sional policy, 26 widespread societal benefit,247 benefit to a particular
class 248 necessity of private enforcement,249 unavailability of mone-
tary damages, 250 and obstacles facing private litigants.251 It seems that
judicial focus upon these factors was directed toward answering two
primary questions in each particular case: (a) whether the successful
litigation by the plaintiff had promoted the public interest, and (b)
whether, because of the litigants involved, fee-shifting was a rational
and fair means of encouraging further socially beneficial private legal
action.
a. The public interest value of the litigation.
It is a fundamental premise of the private attorney general doc-
trine that certain types of litigation generate unusually far-reaching
and profound public impact. Thus the initial step of a private attorney
general fee-shifting analysis is a determination whether the litigation
has served the public interest. In making such determinations, the
lower federal courts examined two factors: (1) the congressional poli-
cies at issue in the litigation, and (2) the extent to which litigation
benefits were enjoyed by non-parties. In some cases, 2 2 courts have
structured their opinions such that inquiries into congressional policy
and extent of benefit to non-litigants were presented as separate ele-
248 See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1971); La
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
211 See, e.g., Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032-34 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975). Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
248 See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
21 See, e.g., Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (5th Cir. 1975); Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 148 (5th Cir. 1971), Sims
v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
"' See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974); Knight v.
Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972) vacated and remanded 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975).
222 It has been stated that "a 'private attorney-general' should be awarded attorneys' fees
when he has effectuated a strong Congressional policy which has benefited a large class of
people . . ." La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis added).
And another court wrote that private attorneys general are "plaintiffs [who] have benefited
their class and have effectuated a strong congressional policy. . :' Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972) (emphasis added).
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ments of a private attorney general fee-shifting analysis. However,
these factors did not seem to constitute independent analytical re-
quirements for fee awards. Rather, it appears they should more pro-
perly be envisioned as mere indicia of the public interest value of a
given piece of litigation.
If there are persuasive recent manifestations of congressional
policy favoring zealous protection of the right which a plaintiff has
vindicated, such legislative expressions may well evidence that the
plaintiff has served the public interest. Certainly that was the effect
of the cognate statutes cited by the Lee court . 53 Congressional policy
mayz4 be an excellent barometer of public policy and thus of the
public interest, but it is not the only one. Hence there was no room
for unwavering insistence that promotion of a strong congressional
policy be discovered before the private attorney general exception
might be invoked. 55 The § 1983 cases demonstrated that the existence
of a strong and explicit congressional policy which had been served
by the relevant litigation was not indispensable to an award of attor-
ney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine. In some of
those cases, congressional policy was not mentioned; 5 ' in others, a
policy sufficiently strong to support fee-shifting was inferred from the
mere existence of the century-old statute.2 7 Thus one court found a
"congressional indication" that federal courts should award attor-
ney's fees to successful § 1983 plaintiffs because "[t]he raison d'etre
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to encourage the vindication of constitutional
rights, to promote litigation of the rights involved, and to give the
courts leeway to fashion appropriate remedies. 258
m See notes 211-15 supra and accompanying text.
2m See generally Tunney, Foreward: Financing the Cost of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 632 (1974).
2" One commentator has aptly observed that an immutable demand that a strong congres-
sional policy be served as a prerequisite to private attorney general fee-shifting
would seem unacceptable in that it is both unnecessarily restrictive in one sense and
overly broad in another. It is unnecessarily limited because it requires that the action
be brought pursuant to a federal statute. Such a requirement would seem to imply
that policies codified in federal statues possess some unique quality. . . . Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to conceive of what this quality might be, or how it generally would
distinguish such suits from public interest actions brought, for example, to vindicate
constitutional rights which are not otherwise codified. . . . The second deficiency
.. . [is the] apparent willingness to award fees in all suits brought to enforce certain
federal statutes ....
Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "'Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to
Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733, 756 (1973) (emphasis in original;
footnote omitted).
"' See Donahue v. Staunton, 477 F.2d 475, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
955 (1973); cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
211 See e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974).
m Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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Correspondingly, judicial examination of the nature and scope
of benefit flowing to non-litigants is an additional method of gauging
the public interest value of litigation. But utilizati on of the private
attorney general exception did not depend upon rigorous inquiry into
the specific effects of a piece of litigation. Benefit to non-litigants
need not be either directly or immediately felt by a large portion of
the populace. As noted in La Raza, "it has become exceedingly diffi-
cult to trace the benefits of litigants to their ultimate beneficiar-
ies. .... -25 Rather than attempt to do so, the lower federal courts
were instead satisfied to ascertain whether a given piece of litigation
had necessarily benefited the public-at-large in some meaningful way.
This determination could often be made only through the exercise of
judicial common sense. Therefore, the federal courts were willing to
take note of the obvious-that some types of litigation, such as that
which challenges official disregard for constitutional rights260 or
which curbs abuse of the environment,26 1 naturally engender great
public benefit.
Thus the initial stage of the private attorney general fee-shifting
analysis was an examination of the importance of the particular liti-
gation to the general public. The requisite degree of importance of
public interest value could be revealed by manifestations of congres-
sional policy, by the self-evident emanation of public benefit from the
litigation, or by some combination of the two.2 12 Legal action which
2g La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
2I See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972), where the court
had no difficulty in concluding that litigation which spurred improvement of treatment and
facilities at state mental institutions was "in the best interest of all Alabamians."
2I See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1972), where Judge
Peckham surmised that "environmental protection, housing relocation and highway construc-
tion are nearly everyone's business, and that almost all of society is better off when public
policies in these areas have been strengthened." See also Widerness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d
1026, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Widerness Soc'y, 95
S. Ct. 1612 (1975). But see Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g 364 F. Supp.
834 (W.D. Tex. 1973). The trial court had awarded attorney's fees to plaintiffs because "even
though the plaintiffs may have. . . technically lost this lawsuit, nevertheless, a very important
service has been performed in creating a greater public awareness of the dangers of pollution
.. ." 364 F. Supp. at 847. The Fifth Circuit, which was quite active in the development of the
private attorney general exception, reversed on the ground that plaintiffs had not served the
public interest sufficiently to support a fee award where they were unable to prevail on an issue
of law. 502 F.2d at 64-66. For a favorable treatment of the lower court's Sierra Club decision,
see Comment, Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees A wards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private
Defendants, 62 GEo. L.J. 1439 (1974).
212 See e.g., Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1401 (5th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d
899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974) vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975); Knight
v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (Ist Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
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promotes the public interest is desirable, indeed essential, where alter-
natives to litigation are unavailing. Therefore, once it was found that
a particular piece of litigation had served the public interest, the
second stage of a private attorney general fee-shifting analysis was
undertaken to determine whether stimulation of further public inter-
est litigation could be effected by an award of attorney's fees.
b. The litigants: encouragement of public interest litigation through
the award of attorney's fees.
In order to determine the propriety of a fee award in public
interest litigation, a lower federal court would look at the parties to
the litigation, particularly the successful plaintiff. Private attorney
general fee-shifting was deemed warranted in public interest litigation
where three circumstances respecting the actual parties coalesced.
First, the plaintiff who had vindicated the public interest should have
been a party who was under no duty to act on the behalf of non-
litigants. There is no need to use fee-shifting as a means of encourag-
ing litigation by a party under a continuing legal obligation to under-
ake the prosecution of public interest actions. Thus the first circum-
stance existed whenever the successful public interest plaintiff was a
person who had voluntarily initiated legal action. Such a party is truly
a private attorney general .6
Second, there must have been a valid reason for commencing
private action rather than relying on public authorities to initiate suit.
That is, there should have been a demonstrable "necessity . . . of
private enforcement ' 264 of the right vindicated by the plaintiff. Such
necessity is present where the cause of action is exclusively private265
or where the relevant prosecutorial agencies are named as defen-
dants.266 Furthermore, private action against private entities may be
necessary where public agencies, although empowered to take action,
are unable or unwilling to discharge their mandated duties.267 No one
143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1971), Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18,23-24 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387, 409 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
3 See generally Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
25 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
25 See, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. (N.D. Cal.
1972).
" "Like La Raza, no remedial action can be expected from public officials, as they are
named as defendants in the action." Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal
1973). See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
25 The Supreme Court has often acknowledged that private enforcement of federal stat-
utes is necessary even though public agencies are empowered to sue. For example, in implying
a private right of action under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970),
the Court explained:
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should be expected to forego legal action, docilely enduring depriva-
tion of his legal rights, merely because public authorities charged with
a duty of enforcement decline to act expeditiously. In such a situa-
tion, private litigation is mandated."6 8
Third, there must have appeared to be financial obstacles inhibit-
ing prosecution of the type of private action undertaken by the plain-
tiff. The lower federal courts recognized that many sorts of private
interest litigation entail great expense and that resources available to
prospective public interest plaintiffs are severely limited. In essence,
the courts found that there existed financial inpediments to litigation
where a public interest plaintiff could envision no realistic possibility
of substantial damage recovery. If the chances of gaining a monetary
judgment are slight or nonexistent, the prospect of a fee award may
nonetheless spur the investment of money or energy necessary to
promote the public interest through private litigation.26 Therefore,
courts did not probe the financial wherewithal of particular
plaintiffs.20 Nor was it deemed relevant that a plaintiff had been
spared the hardship of out-of-pocket cost because legal services were
furnished without charge; in such cases, fees would be awarded di-
rectly to whomever supplied the plaintiff with legal assistance.?2' It
The achievement of the Act's laudable goal could be severely hampered, however, if
each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion
of the Attorney General. . . The Attorney General has a limited staff. . . . It is
consistent with the broad purpose of the Act to allow the individual citizen to insure
that his city or county government complies ....
Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969). See also authorities cited in note 390
infra.
2M Cf Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975). Despite the fact that the federal
government was statutorily charged with enforcement, and although the United States Attor-
ney General had in fact intervened in the plaintiffs' private Voting Rights Act suit, the Fifth
Circuit reversed the trial court's determination that plaintiffs were not entitled to a fee award
under the private attorney general doctrine. Id. at 1402.
69 There is a need for private enforcement. . . and awarding attorneys' fees encour-
age private enforcement actions. This is particularly vital here since damages are not
available.
Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added); accord, Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D.
Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). See also Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143,
147-48 (5th Cir. 1971).
210 Given the primary goal of encouraging public interest litigation it would seem to make
little sense to distinguish among private attorneys general on the basis of relative economic
strength. But cf Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 672 (1974). Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney
General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733,
758 (1973).
"I See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1971); La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 n. 6 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Federal courts have usually awarded
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was enough that discretionary resources, necessarily limited in
amount, had been expended in pursuit of the public interest.
Thus the second stage of the private attorney general fee-shifting
analysis was an examination of the situation faced by the public
interest plaintiff at the time litigation was commenced. This examina-
tion was not comprehensive. In a sense, it comprised an objective
appraisal of the factors which may have affected the decision whether
to litigate. The goal of this examination was to ascertain whether an
award of fees could stimulate further desirable private action by
ameliorating the financial barriers which confront public interest
plaintiffs. If a plaintiff who has served the public interest was under
no duty to initiate legal action, if private litigation was seemingly
required for timely vindication of the public interest, and if there was
no apparent financial incentive for the plaintiff to bring suit, then the
plaintiff has truly functioned as a private attorney general. An award
of fees to such a plaintiff will encourage others to become private
attorneys general by obviating the financial disincentives to public
interest litigation.
VI. THE ALYESKA PIPELINE CASE
A. The Events Preceding the Alyeska Pipeline Case
The 1968 discovery of vast oil reserves on Alaska's North led to
preparations for the construction of a trans-Alaska pipeline to facili-
tate commercial exploitation of the new oilfield .2 1 A consortium of
petroleum firms created the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to
undertake construction and operation of such a pipeline.2Y3 The pro-
attorneys' fees to organizations providing counsel for successful plaintiffs in actions enforcing
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which includes express provisions for discretionary fee-shifting.
See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1971); Miller v. Amusement
Enterprises, Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 1970); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F.
Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970). However, fee-shifting has been denied to the extent that a
successful plaintiff's representation was furnished by a federally funded legal services office.
See Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972). For discussion of the value of making
fee awards to sources of gratuitous legal services, see Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's
Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 681-700 (1974); Note, Awards
of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411 (1973). See also McLaughlin,
supra note 7.
" A broad discussion of many of the events and developments preceding and attending
the dispute over construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline is presented in Dominick and
Brody, The Alaska Pipeline; Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. REV. 337 (1973).
' Alyeska is owned by a consortium of seven petroleum companies. Alyeska, formed in
1970, superseded the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, which had been organized in 1968. See
Dominick and Brody, supra note 272, at 337-39.
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posed pipeline was to transport oil nearly 800 miles from Prudhoe
Bay on the North Slope to Valdez, a port city accessible to oil tank-
ers. Because much of the proposed pipeline route crossed lands owned
by the federal government, applications for necessary rights-of-way
were filed with the Department of the Interior.
Many environmentalists became alarmed about the possible
adverse effects of a trans-Alaska oil pipeline. In early 1970, three
environmentalist organizations-Wilderness Society, Friends of the
Earth and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.-filed suit against Sec-
retary of the Interior Walter Hickel. Seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, the plaintiffs contended that the imminent grant of right-
of-way permits to Alyeska would violate both the width restrictions
of § 28 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920274 and the environ-
mental impact statement requirements of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969.211 A federal district court issued a preliminary
injunction proscribing the approval of Alyeska's right-of-way appli-
cations by Secretary Hickel .2 1 Thereafter, Alyeska and the State of
Alaska intervened as defendants. The district court subsequently dis-
solved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the plaintiffs' com-
plaints.2 11
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed the trial court and permanently enjoined the
issuance of the right-of-way permits for the pipeline? 8 Although rec-
ognizing the importance of ready access to the North Slope oil re-
serves,219 the court felt that its decision was compelled by the terms
-4 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), which provided in part:
Rights-of-way through the public lands . . . of the United States, may be
granted by the Secretary of the Interior for pipeline purposes for the transportation
of oil or natural gas . . . to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipe line
and twenty-five feet on each side of the same...
Since the proposed pipeline was to be four feet in width, plaintiffs contended that Alyeska
could not lawfully be granted a right-of-way exceeding fifty-four feet under the terms of the
statute. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 853 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
917 (1973).
'5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c)(1970).
8 Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
2 This decision was rendered on August 15, 1972, but it was not reported.
21 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973). Rogers Morton had supplanted Walter Hickel as Secretary of the Interior during the
pendency of the litigation.
" Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote the opinion of the majority. He stated that "we
wish to note first that we have . . . an awareness of the severe impacts our ruling will have."
479 F.2d at 847. The opinion further specifically alluded to the importance of the litigation to
the oil companies which own Alyeska and to the economic well-being of the State of Alaska
and its residents. Id.
COMMENT
of § 28 of the MLLA. 211 Since this issue established the plaintiffs'
right to relief, the court expressly declined to reach the NEPA ques-
tion. 2 1 The merits of the dispute were thereafter mooted by congres-
sional passage of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act,
which amended the MLLA~2 and explicitly exempted the proposed
pipeline from the requirements of NEPA.283
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision to A ward Attorney's Fees: The
Private Attorney General Doctrine Distended
Following their prosecution of the injunction action, the plain-
tiffs requested an award of attorney's fees from the court of appeals.
With the court sitting en banc, a bare majority held that fee-shifting
was warranted and therefore remanded the case to the district court
for determination of the appropriate amount of the fee award. 24 The
majority, in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Wright, found that
the bad faith and fund exceptions to the no-fee rule were inapplicable
but concluded that a fee award was justified under the private attor-
21 We base our decision on a literal reading of Section 28, the legislative history
of that section, and the settled construction of the administrative regulations. In
brief, it is our view that the legislative history clearly indicates that when Congress
enacted Section 28 it intended that all construction work take place within the
confines of the width limitation of that section-that is, within the area covered by
the pipe itself (4 feet) and 25 feet on either side.
Id.
Alyeska desired use of federal lands over the course of the pipeline route at a minimum
of 100 feet in width. Grant of additional land rights was sought for the northern half of the
pipeline route to make possible the construction of a necessary access highway. The original
pipeline application was a request for rights-of-way which reflected all of Alyeska's land needs.
Subsequently, in an apparent attempt to evade the right-of-way width limitations of the MLLA,
Alyeska submitted an amended application. Under the second application, which was the one
whose approval was challenged by the plaintiffs, Alyeska sought a single right-of-way fifty-four
feet wide but also requested issuance of "Special Land Use Permits" for use of additional lands
adjoining the right-of-way. The court of appeals found that the requested Special Land Use
Permits, because they were to be irrevocable, were indistinguishable from rights-of-way in the
contemplation of the law. Thus, in substance, the amended application was no different from
the first, and grant of the requested permits was therefore precluded by §28 of the MLLA. See
id. at 847, 849-55.
"I Id. at 848. The essence of the plaintiffs NEPA contentions was that, although a six
volume impact statement had been produced, the statutory impact statement standards had not
been met; that the Department of the Interior had failed to "adequately consider the pipeline
route through Canada or the alternative of deferral of a decision until more information on
the Canadian alternative can be obtained." Id. at 847.
2S2 Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, Title I, § 101, 87 Stat.
576 (1973), amending 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1974)).
I Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act, Title II, § 202(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1651(d)
(Supp. 1974).
21 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), noted in 36 OHIo ST.
L.J. 201 (1975).
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ney general doctrine. Three members of the court adamently disa-
greed with the reasoning employed by the majority.285 The fee-shifting
decision of the court of appeals is notable, and of questionable sound-
ness, in two aspects: its holding that plaintiffs had served as private
attorneys general and its holding that Alyeska was a proper party
against whom to assess an award of attorney's fees.
1. The Majority's Holding That Plaintiffs Had Served As Private
Attorneys General
Judge Wright described the private attorney general doctrine in
the following terms:
When violation of a congressional enactment has caused little injury
to any one individual, but great harm to important public interests
when viewed from the perspective of the broad class intended to be
protected by that statute, not to award counsel fees can seriously
frustrate the purposes of Congress .. . .Where the law relies on
private suits to effectuate congressional policy in favor of broad
public interests, attorneys' fees are often necessary to ensure that
private litigants will initiate such suits. 286
The consideration of the necessity of private enforcement,2 7 the fin-
ancial burden of such private action288 and the absence of pecuniary
incentive to undertake litigation received only brief mention in the
court's opinion. With respect to the private attorney general analysis,
the focal point of the majority's attention, and the primary source of
the dissenters' disagreement,"8 concerned whether the plaintiffs had
in fact enhanced "broad public interests."
a. The public interest and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act.
Judge Wright quickly brushed aside the contention that "the
width limitation in Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
does not amount to a congressional policy of preeminent import-
ance. ' 20 Under the view of the majority, the plaintiffs' successful
285 Circuit Judges MacKinnon and Wilkey wrote dissenting opinions. Circuit Judges
MacKinnon and Robb concurred with the dissent of Judge Wilkey.
11 495 F.2d at 1030 (citations omitted).
U Id.
I' d. at 1032.
" Although they strongly opposed the award of fees to the Alyeska Pipeline plaintiffs,
the dissenting jurists did not express blanket disapproval of the private attorney general fee-
shifting doctrine. See generally id. at 1039-42 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), 1042-46 (Wilkey,
J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 1032.
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prosecution of the § 28 issue did serve broad public interests and
thereby engendered widespread benefit. Such benefit did not, how-
ever, emanate from the enforcement of the MLLA width restrictions
per se. Rather, the court of appeals majority found that the public
interest had been served due to two considerations not directly related
to the substantive nature of the MLLA.
First, the majority found that the plaintiffs' MLLA contentions
and the resultant permanent injunction had vindicated constitutional
values. Specifically, the court felt that the injunction had preserved
the constitutional apportionment of power among the branches of
federal government by preventing the Secretary of the Interior from
transgressing a valid congressional mandate. 21 Certainly the public
interest is served to some extent whenever constitutional values are
protected. But to merely recast litigation issues in constitutional
terms, as done by Judge Wright, does not appreciably advance a
private attorney general fee-shifting analysis. The verbal escalation
of statutory construction to a matter of constitutional proportions,
without more, affords no basis for differentiating among the aggre-
gate of civil litigation involving federal statutes. Any such action may
be said to enhance constitutional values since a proper decision on
the merits tends to ensure that Congress retains primacy-with re-
spect to private parties, governmental entities and the other branches
of the federal government-within the sphere of endeavor constitu-
tionally allotted to the legislature. Or, conversely, it ensures that
Congress does not exceed the bounds of its constitutional authority. 9 2
Second, the majority found that the injunction obtained by the
plaintiffs led to the amendment of the MLLA and that the amended
version "imposes several important new requirements designed to
211 In the final analysis, this case involved the duty of the Executive Branch to
observe the restrictions imposed by the Legislative,. . . and the primary responsibil-
ity of the Congress under the Constitution to regulate the use of public lands ....
The proper functioning of our system of government under the Constitution is,
of course, important to every American, and in this sense appellants' suit had great
therapeutic value.
Id. at 1033 (citations omitted).
2 Indeed, it might be contended that, to some extent, every lawsuit promotes the public
interest in that the rule of law is thereby vindicated. Cf Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 604; Note,
Private Attorney General Fees Emerge From the Wilderness, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 258, 264
(1974). Any properly instituted federal court action could be said to promote constitutional
values-although neither involving constitutional issues nor concerning matters of general
public significance-in that it helps to effectuate the federal judiciary's performance of its
constitutionally assigned role. Thus the bare incantation of the words "Constitution" or "con-
stitutional" provides an exceedingly shallow basis for a finding of significant public interest
value.
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protect the publict interest. ' 23 Thus, reasoned the majority, "Forc-
ing Alyeska to go to Congress to amend the 1920 Act certainly was
not a sterile exercise in legal technicalities devoid of public signifi-
cance."294 Yet, even assuming that the public interest has been ad-
vanced in a significant manner by the safeguards included in the
MLLA amendments, ameliorative congressional action was not a
necessary concomitant of the plaintiffs' victory on the § 28 issue. That
is, unlike the circumstances present in other private attorney general
fee-shifting cases,295 the widespread benefit perceived by the majority
was not the direct result of the decree earlier obtained by the plain-
tiffs. 26 Moreover, it seems rather incongruous, in the context of a
private attorney general fee-shifting analysis, to attribute to the plain-
tiffs' efforts the public benefit accruing from legislation enacted to
facilitate the very events which the plaintiffs had fervently sought to
forestall.
b. The public interest, NEPA and the importance of "winning".
The court of appeals majority also felt that the award of attor-
ney's fees was justified by the plaintiffs' litigation of the NEPA envi-
ronmental impact statement issue. After generally alluding to the
great public interest value of litigation which impedes despoilation of
environmental resources, Judge Wright offered:
Nor do we think it of controlling importance that this court did
not actually decide the NEPA issues and that Congress has subse-
quently decided in the pipeline legislation that the impact statement
prepared by the Department of the Interior shall be deemed suffi-
cient under NEPA. . . .The advancement of important legislative
495 F.2d at 1033. The modernization of the MLLA did include some quite far-reaching
changes. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1974) with 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
294 495 F.2d at 1033.
21 In other cases the benefits perceived by the courts granting private attorney general fee
awards were intrinsic to the precise merits of the disputes. That is, the plaintiffs in such cases
served the public interest by seeking and successfully procuring judicial proscription of offensive
conduct. Service to the public interest is, in such a case, virtually apparent on the face of the
court's decree; it is the necessary effect of the injunction obtained by the plaintiff-that unlaw-
ful activity is thereafter prevented-that engenders widespread public benefit. See, e.g., Bran-
denburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1972); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (Ist Cir. 1972).
"I Although the lawsuit ultimately led to arguably salutary action by Congress, Judge
Wright never forthrightly addressed the question of what important public policy was vindi-
cated by the enjoining of the issuance of right-of-way permits to Alyeska. He stated that the
suit had vindicated "important statutory rights of all citizens whose interests might be affected
by construction of the pipeline," 495 F.2d at 1032, but never fully illumined why the matters
in issue were deemed to be "important statutory rights."
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policy justifying an award of attorneys' fees can be accomplished
even where the plaintiff does not obtain the ultimate relief sought
.. . Where litigation serves as a catalyst to effect change and
thereby achieves a valuable public service, an award of fees may be
appropriate even though a suit never proceeds to a successful con-
clusion on the merits.2 97
The viewpoint expressed in the above passage finds little direct
support in the reported case law. Other courts have required a recipi-
ent of a private attorney general fee award to prevail on the merits
in order to demonstrate the worthiness of his litigation posture."9 '
Some limits must exist for implementation of private attorney gen-
eral fee-shifting, and it seems that a logical requisite for a fee award
would be the vindication of a substantial public policy by enforcing,
rather than merely litigating, a legal principle. There are at least two
sound reasons why such a threshold requirement might be estab-
lished. First, whatever the desirability of alleviating the plaintiffs
financial burden in prosecuting a particular piece of litigation, some
basis must exist for compelling another party to assume that burden.
No such basis exists with respect to a party who has not been found
to have broken some legal rule relative to the matter litigated. 9
Second, the imposition of a threshold requirement that the plaintiff
"win" the principal dispute confines judicial inquiry to the proper
side of that line which separates implementation of public policy from
active policy-making. At a minimum, it ensures that judicial scrutiny
of the beneficial impact of litigation is centered upon matters of
policy accorded sufficient weight to warrant their embodiment in
principles of law.310
N7 Id. at 1034 (citations omitted). Judge Wright had said that "the commitment to improv-
ing and protecting our natural environment is one of the most vital of current national policies."
Id.
295 But see Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1974). In an environmental action brought pursuant to a statute which provided for
permissive fee-shifting, a fee award was made to plaintiffs who prevailed on some, but not all,
issues in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973). A
federal district court, declining to make a statutorily permitted fee award to a losing environ-
mentalist plaintiff, cautioned that an award to an unsuccessful party, even where authorized
by Congress, should be a rarity. See Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical
Co., 62 F.R.D. 353 (D. Del. 1974).
"I See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 65 (5th Cir. 1974); accord, Golden v. Kentile
Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 1975); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 178 (5th Cir.
1975).
"I Of course Congress may, and in a few instances has, expressly authorized federal
courts to shift the fees of a party who has not "won" his case. In a case involving one such
statute, § 304(d) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (Supp. 1974),
the court counseled that much circumspection should attend the decision whether a losing party
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The court of appeals majority stated that the plaintiff's NEPA
appeal "helped focus attention in Congress on the major issue
raised-the relative merits of a trans-Canadian versus a trans-
Alaskan route.""'' Again, 3 2 a result of this type seems rather re-
mote to admit of judicial consideration in a private attorney general
fee-shifting analysis. Instigation of increased congressional awareness
of and attention to significant issues may indeed be in the public
interest,3 3 but there are usually more effective, and proper, methods
of arousing legislative concern than litigation. 4
Judge Wright also suggested that "appellants' lawsuit and ap-
peal served as a catalyst to ensure that the Department of the Interior
drafted an impact statement and that the statement was thorough and
complete."3 It is true that no impact statement had yet been pro-
duced at the time that the plaintiffs commenced their injunction ac-
tion. Thus, to the extent that the institution of the lawsuit compelled
the government to comply with the law, it may be said that the NEPA
litigation was successful. 6 However, the impact statement had been
should have an award of fees. See Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical
Co., 62 F.R.D. 353, 354-55 (D. Del. 1974).
495 F.2d at 1035 (footnote omitted).
32 This "benefit" seems to be essentially the same as that previously mentioned by the
majority, id. at 1033, with respect to the amendment of the MLLA. The majority apparently
agreed with Judge Wilkey that "in retrospect is precisely the way the award of attorneys' fees
is always judged." Id. at 1042 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). However, it is suggested by the writer
that the public interest value of a lawsuit could be more meaningfully explored without the
distortion of hindsight. It is the merit of the suit and the necessary impact of the relief sought,
judged at the time an action is filed, which should determine whether the plaintiff is a private
attorney general. If the purpose of private attorney general fee-shifting is to encourage certain
types of litigation, a plaintiff's eligibility for such an award should be neither enhanced nor
hindered by fortuities which occur subsequent to the institution of the lawsuit. Cf Souza v.
Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1139 (1st Cir. 1975).
m There is much room for doubt whether it was in the best interest of the country that
the dispute in this case finally necessitated congressional action. See 495 F.2d at 1039 (MacKin-
non, J., dissenting).
"' The court of appeals majority did not mention that there exist more direct, conven-
tional and acceptable means to "focus attention in Congress" on particular matters. Certainly
such is not the usual function of litigation. However, at least one other court has noted the
positive value of third party awareness generated by litigation. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364
F. Supp. 834, 847-49 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Comment,
Balancing the Equities in Attorney's Fees A wards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants,
62 GEO. L.J. 1439 (1974).
3 495 F.2d at 1034.
1 Where the institution of legal action induces the defendant to conform his behavior to
legal standards, the plaintiff has accomplished the objective of litigation even though no formal
relief is granted. Such a plaintiff, although not technically a "winner," is nonetheless "success-
ful." Accord, Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970). Thus ultimate victory in the
form of a judicial decree may not be vital for an award of attorney's fees. Cf McEnteggart v.
Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1111 (Ist Cir. 1971); Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc., 62 F.R.D.
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submitted before the trial court's 1972 decision and it was then held
sufficient. Later, Congress also decreed that the impact statement did
not violate NEPA. Therefore, since the plaintiffs had requested re-
covery of the attorney's fees incurred on appeal only, the court of
appeals majority, in effect, found that the plaintiffs had advanced the
public interest by contesting an impact statement which had been
determined, both judicially and legislatively, legally acceptable.
c. An additional factor: the clash of countervailing public policies.
The court of appeals dissenters, accentuating the importance of
policies running counter to those which the environmentally-
concerned plaintiffs had attempted to effectuate, vehemently argued
that the litigation had disserved the public interest. Circuit Judge
MacKinnon focused primarily upon the intent of the plaintiffs,
through their NEPA allegations, to force construction of a trans-
Canada, rather than a trans-Alaska, pipeline. This objective, he as-
serted, was in marked derogation of the express national policy" 7
favoring independence from foreign nations for American energy
needs .308
Circuit Judge Wilkey's dissent stressed the more comprehensive
public policy in favor of prompt and thorough exploitation of avail-
able energy resources. Although not impugning the plaintiffs' sincer-
ity, he opined:
Judging from Congress' most recent action, these plaintiffs have
been frustrating the policy Congress considers highly desirable and
of the utmost urgency.
Nor do we agree that "this litigation may well have provided
substantial benefits to particular individuals." . . . It is hard to
visualize the average American in this winter of 1973-74, turning
down his thermostat and with a careful eye on his auto fuel gage,
feeling the warm glow of gratitude to those public-spirited plaintiffs
in the Alaska Pipeline case.
.. . By delaying the obtaining of oil from the North Slope of
Alaska for several years, the plaintiffs conferred no public benefit
353, 355 (D. Del. 1974). See also King and Plater, supra note 32, at 78-79.
"I Judge MacKinnon cited § 8 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1337 (1970), as the embodpment of this policy. 495 F.2d at 1040.
" [The majority judges] seek now to compensate a group whose principal
objective . . . was to make our vital energy needs further dependent upon another
foreign country. . . . While we must suffer for the substantial delay caused by these
misguided decisions, I refuse to concur in paying for the efforts of those who sought
to further aggravate the injury.
Id. at 1041.
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on the United States of America."9
Thus this case, perhaps more tellingly than any preceding it,310
featured the troublesome question of how a private attorney general
fee-shifting analysis can accomodate the clash of countervailing pub-
lic policies. Judge Wilkey advocated a weighing of competing poli-
cies, with the court taking cognizance of the "net" benefit, if any,
generated by the litigation.3 1  The majority, on the other hand,
seemed to strain to discount any indication that there existed a credit-
able public policy in competition with the plaintiffs' environmental
goals.31 1 It would appear that the better approach for exploring the
public interest value of litigation is to simply consider that policy
which, as evidenced by the resolution of the-merits of a dispute, is
favored by the substantive law.3
d. An assessment: the Alyeska Pipeline plaintiffs as private
attorneys general.
Other courts which awarded attorney's fees under the private
attorney general doctrine did so on the ground that the plaintiff
vindicated the public interest, consequently benefitting numerous
non-litigants by enforcing a rule of law suffused with important pub-
lic policy implications. Where a plaintiff succeeds in having a
continuing deprivation of civil rights enjoined, the service to the pub-
lic interest is obvious: it inheres in the decree of the court -which
thereafter protects all citizens from similar encroachment upon their
Id. at 1042 (emphasis in original).
310 The discordant interplay of competing policies seems to be especially prominent in
environmental litigation since achievement of environmental goals usually requires that other
desirable, often economic, objectives be correspondingly diminished. In civil rights litigation,
a court need not retard socially desirable conduct in order to provide needed relief for the
meritorius plaintiff. Compare La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), with
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
31 This stands as plaintiffs' net achievement: the amendment of the .1920 Min-
eral Leasing Act to authorize a wider right of way, quite the opposite of the plaintiffs'
objective to limit the right of way to 25 feet on each side. Against this public service
must be weighed the public disservice in blocking access to the much needed oil at a
critical time in our history, and the enormously higher cost we all must pay.
495 F.2d at 1043 (emphasis in original).
"I The majority concluded that the plaintiffs had "advanced and protected in a very
concrete manner substantial public interests." Id. at 1036. The majority opinion never identified
with specificity the interests which plaintiffs had served and made no reference to any public
policies disserved by the litigation.
3 See generally King and Plater, supra note 32, at 66-67.
" See, e.g., Bondv. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975); Brandenburger v. Thompson,
494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 955 (1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
COMMENT
civil rights. The widespread benefit is part and parcel of the court's
decision to forbid further offensive behavior.
In the Alyeska Pipeline case the plaintiffs did in fact obtain the
injunction which they had sought. Yet the court of appeals majority,
in its fee-shifting opinion, failed to fully illumine how, if at all, enjoin-
ing the issuance of right-of-way permits directly enhanced the public
interest. Instead, the majority chose to discern service to the public
interest through a series of non-judicial events-events precipitated
by the "catalytic" effect of the plaintiffs' lawsuit. Perhaps, as deter-
mined by the majority, the cumulative impact of the incidents
spawned by the principal litigation warranted an award of attorney's
fees to the plaintiffs. But it would seem that a far preferable method
for gauging the public interest value of a given piece of litigation
involves ascertainment of the beneficial impact of the merits of the
litigation, not the mere fact of litigation. Hence it is suggested that
the Alyeska Pipeline case presented a much less compelling justifi-
cation for finding that the plaintiffs functioned as private attorneys
general than did the private attorney general fee-shifting cases of
other lower federal courts.
2. The Majority's Holding That Alyeska Was a Proper Party
Against Whom to Assess an Award of Attorney's Fees
The second significant aspect of the A lyeska Pipeline fee-shifting
decision of the court of appeals is that attorney's fees were assessed
against the defendant-intervenor Alyeska. After determining that the
case was a proper one for private attorney general fee-shifting, the
court held that an award of fees against the Department of the Inte-
rior was statutorily proscribed. 15 And the majority believed that
forcing defendant-intervenor State of Alaska to share in the burden
of the fee award would be inappropriate. 1 The court nevertheless
declared that attorney's fees" 7 could properly be assessed against
Alyeska because the pipeline company "was a major and real party
at interest in this case, actively participating in the litigation along
with the Government. .. .
This portion of the majority's holding was almost certainly ill-
considered. The court noted that the propriety of such an award
2" 495 F.2d at 1036. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
". 495 F.2d at 1036 & n. 8. See notes 324-27 infra and accompanying text.
3,7 The court held that an award of "only half of the total fees" was proper in view of
"the Government's role in the case" and the statutory bar to fee-shifting against the Depart-
ment of the Interior. 495 F.2d at 1036.
319 Id.
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against Alyeska was open to question since it was the federal govern-
ment, not Alyeska, which had to be enjoined from violating the
MLLA.3 19 However, explained the court, the goal of private attorney
general fee-shifting is the encouragement of private litigants to pro-
tect the public interest rather than to punish law violators. This view,
coupled with the fact that Alyeska had intervened in the litigation to
protect its "massive interests," led the majority to conclude that
assessing a fee award against Alyeska was palatable.
The Fifth Circuit, responsible for a number of notable private
attorney general fee-shifting decisions,20 adopted the opposite view
in Sierra Club v. Lynn,32' a case which factually parallelled Alyeska
Pipeline. In Sierra Club, which in part concerned a NEPA environ-
mental impact statement issue, the federal district court assessed an
award of attorney's fees against a private developer who had con-
tracted to construct a federally-funded housing development. 2 In
reversing the lower court's award of attorney's fees, the Fifth Circuit
expressly declined to follow the reasoning employed by the Alyeska
Pipeline majority.323 Although agreeing with the trial court's deter-
mination that the plaintiffs had served as private attorneys general,
the Fifth Circuit found that the Department of Housing and Urban
Development was the sole defendant who violated NEPA. Since the
private defendant had not been responsible for HUD's failings, the
court decided that equity would not countenance an assessment of a
fee award against the developer, notwithstanding the fact that HUD
was entirely insulated from liability.3 4
The weakness of the Alyeska Pipeline court of appeals major-
ity's decision to shift fees against Alyeska was perhaps best demon-
strated by their unconvincing attempt to contrast the respective
31 "Technically, it is the Interior Department, on Alyeska's application, which violated
the Mineral Leasing Act by granting rights-of-way in excess of the Act's width restrictions, and
it is the Interior Department's failure to comply with NEPA which was challenged on appeal."
Id.
320 See, e.g. Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d
598 (5th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites
Corp. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
121 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974).
32 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 847-52 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 43
(5th Cir. 1974).
3 502 F.2d at 65.
" In the absence of proof that the private party controlled the government
agency's actions or caused its default, it cannot be cast in judgment as a result of
the agency's shortcomings. The fact that the breach of duty involved was committed
by one who is immune from liability for financial redress affords no basis for a
shifting of fees.
Id. at 66.
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litigation roles played by Alyeska and the State of Alaska. Both
parties had intervened as defendants. But Alyeska was said to have
entered the litigation in order to "protect its massive interests, ' 13
whereas the State of Alaska "voluntarily participated in this suit, in
effect to present to the court a different version of the public interest
implications of the trans-Alaska pipeline." 2 Yet Judge Wright him-
self had noted the tremendous financial stakes which both Alyeska
and the State of Alaska had in expediting construction of the trans-
Alaska pipeline during the court's 1973 decision on the merits.32 The
apparent paucity of foundation for the disparite fashion in which the
majority chose to characterize the litigation roles of the two interven-
ors lends some credence to Judge MacKinnon's assertion that the
true ground for decision was that "oil companies are prosperous,
appellants are poor, and therefore oil companies should finance both
sides of this litigation."' 2s
C. The Supreme Court Decision in the Alyeska Pipeline Case: The
Private Attorney General Interred
When certiorari was granted in the Alyeska Pipeline case, 2 the
validity of the private attorney general exception was finally subject
to assay by the Supreme Court. It might reasonably have been pre-
dicted that the Court would give its imprimatur to the private attor-
ney general doctrine as an acceptable ground for extrastatutory fee-
shifting.330 Much of the doctrine had been derived directly from the
Court's Piggie Park opinion. Since Piggie Park involved a statute
which authorizes fee awards, that case did not constitute decisive
• 495 F.2d at 1036.
' Id. at n. 8.
"n Any decision further enjoining construction of this project will impose seri-
ous costs on the oil companies who plan to build the pipeline and who have made
substantial investments that cannot begin to show a return until oil begins to flow
from their wells at Prudhoe Bay. The project means much needed jobs and income
to the people of the State of Alaska, and development of Prudhoe Bay oil resources
will bring forth badly needed revenues for the Alaska State Treasury.
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
" 495 F.2d at 1042 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The majority placed great emphasis
upon Alyeska's financial might, declaring that the rationale behind the no-fee rule is weakest
where there is a wealthy defendant who would not be intimidated by the prospect of fee-shifting.
Id. at 1031-32. Though this would appear to be generally true, the presence in a lawsuit of a
deep pocket against whom attorney's fees might be assessed certainly does not afford an inde-
pendent ground for fee-shifting. Accord, Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Boehning, 511 F.2d
834, 838 (7th Cir. 1975).
- 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
13 See King and Plater, supra note 32, at 55-56.
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authority for the validity of extrastatutory private attorney general
fee-shifting as an exercise of discretionary equitable power. Yet it
appeared that the impact of this key distinction-that under the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine the courts act without explicit congres-
sional direction-had been effectively ameliorated by Mills and by
the thoughtful private attorney general decisions in the lower federal
courts.
Of course, any discretionary power vested in the judiciary is
subject to abuse. Although the essential private attorney general doc-
trine, as developed and implemented by the lower federal courts,
appeared to create a sound basis for the exercise of the federal judici-
ary's inherent power to award attorney's fees, effective limits for the
doctrine's invocation would ultimately have needed to be established.
Thus the Alyeska Pipeline case seemed a particularly good one for
review by the Supreme Court. Because the fee-shifting decision of the
court of appeals was questionable in several respects, the case could
have been a vehicle for the Court to furnish guidance concerning the
parameters of the private attorney general doctrine.
It was not to happen. The Supreme Court reversed the Alyeska
Pipeline fee-shifting decision of the court of appeals. 31 Although
the reversal was not surprising in view of the comparative weakness
of the case, the Court went much further and ruled that fee awards
to those functioning as private attorneys general are wholly imper-
missible in the absence of an authorizing statute. After an initial
recitation of the Alyeska Pipeline facts, the Court found scant need
to make reference to the specific situation before it. Nor did the
Court reach a full-scale consideration of the intrinsic equitable merit
of the private attorney general doctrine. The Court was spared these
tasks by its discernment of a more comprehensive ground for deci-
sion. The Court, by a five to two margin,"' held that Congress had
circumscribed the power of federal courts to award attorney's fees
and that, as a matter of statutory construction, the general discretion-
ary fee-shifting power remaining at the disposal of the federal courts
encompassed only the two traditional exceptions to the no-fee rule.
1. Reading the Federal Fee Statutes to Limit the Power of Federal
Courts to Award Attorney's Fees
The first, and nearly decisive, prong of the Alyeska Pipeline
= Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).
33 Justices Marshall and Brennan filed dissenting opinions, and Justices Douglas and
Powell did not sit.
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Court's opinion dealt with the effect of the federal fee statutes. The
Court concluded that the federal costs statute and docket fee stat-
ute,333 collectively denominated the "fee statutes" by the Court, are
a congressional foreclosure of extrastatutory fee-shifting by the fed-
eral courts. Despite copious documentation of this portion of the
Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall aptly characterized the Court's
interpretation of the fee statutes when he stated that it "flies squarely
in the face of our prior cases.1 34
The Court initially determined that the federal fee statutes repre-
sent a codification of the no-fee rule. Although noting that the no-
fee rule found its first expression in an early decision of the Supreme
Court 3 5 the Court went on to recount that during the period from
1789 to 1853 lower federal courts made awards of attorney's fees in
accordance with the rules of the states in which they sat. Originally
this practice had been mandated by a federal statute,36 and if con-
tinued to be observed long after the expiration of that legislation.
Therefore, in the view of the Court, the 1853 enactment of a federal
fee-bill statute, 37 the predecessor of today's fee statutes, was a
wholesale repudiation of extrastatutory federal court fee-shifting:
The result was a far-reaching act specifying in detail the nature and
amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal courts. One of its
purposes was to limit allowances for attorneys' fees that were to be
charged to the losing parties."'
The A lyeska Pipeline Court then proceeded to trace the path of
the 1853 fee-bill statute through a succession of legislative revisions
to its present embodiment in § 1920 and § 1923(a). The current federal
fee statutes differ markedly from the original fee-bill statute with
respect to terminology. In particular, while the 1853 Act provided
that "no other compensation [than that contained in the section's
schedule of fees] shall be taxed and allowed,;" § 1920 now merely
states that enumerated items, including the § 1923(a) docket fees,
= 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970). Section 1920, the costs statute, provides that
federal courts "may tax as costs" certain enumerated items, including § 1923 docket fees.
Section 1923(a) states, "Attorney's and proctor's docket fees in courts of the United States
may be taxed as costs . . ." and then specifies the amount, twenty dollars in most actions,
which can be taxed as a docket fee.
' 95 S. Ct. at 1629 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95 S. Ct. at 1618, quoting Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93.
Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161. Prior to a listing of recoverable amounts
of attorney's fees, the Act stated "the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and
allowed."
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"6may be taxed as costs." The Alyeska Pipeline Court acknowledged
this alteration in phraseology but believed that it had been accom-
plished "without any apparent intent to change the controlling
rules. '339 The accuracy of this belief, though far from being unas-
sailable, 340 need not be countered in order to conclude that the Court
misapprehended the nature of those "controlling rules." The Court'
quoted several century-old decisions34 in which the 1853 statute had
been discussed in order to find indications of the import of the federal
fee statutes. From these early cases the Court gleaned that the 1853
Act comprised a "statutory rule that allowances for counsel fees are
limited to the sums specified by the costs statute. ' 342 However, this
view of the fee statutes utterly fails to account for the myriad instan-
ces of judicial fee-shifting by federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, subsequent to these early cases relied upon. It was this matter
which the Alyeska Pipeline Court next addressed.
The Court, in effect, stated that there had been no proper incid-
ences of extrastatutory fee-shifting. On the contrary, judicial fee-
shifting resulted not from the use of inherent equitable power but
from statutory construction: "To be sure, the fee statutes have been
construed to allow, in limited circumstances, a reasonable attorneys'
fee to the prevailing party in excess of the small sums permitted by §
1923."1 3 It is true, as noted by the Court, "  that writers of early
fund fee-shifting opinions took care to distinguish costs "as between
solicitor and client" from those "as between party and party," since
' 95 S. Ct. at 1619.
311 Id. at 1620-21. The 1853 Act was retained through the statutory revisions of 1874
and 1911. See id. & nn. 26-27. The change in the language of the fee statutes occurred during
the 1948 updating of the Judicial Code. In essence, the majority's assertion that no material
change was intended by the 1948 revisers rested upon the absence of any salient manifestations
of such an intent. See id. at 1621 n. 29.
54 See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
'1 95 S. Ct. at 1620, quoting The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869); Flanders
v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450, 452-53 (1872).
32 95 S. Ct. at 1620. Although it is true that The Baltimore and Flanders v. Tweed
opinions contained language reflecting an extremely rigid interpretation of the 1853 fee-bill
statute, it is nevertheless doubtful that those decisions should be accorded significant weight as
indicia of current federal court equitable fee-shifting power. The precedential value of The
Baltimore has not been great. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). And in Flanders,
the Supreme Court's holding was that an award of attorney's fees by a jury was impermissible.
Furthermore, during the same era in which those two cases were decided, the Court broadly
intimated that federal courts sitting in equity possessed the undiminished powers of the English
High Court of Chancery. See Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); Fontain v.
Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1855).
M 95 S. Ct. at 1620.
3' Id.
COMMENT
the former were unquestionably beyond the ambit of the fee-bill stat-
ute. The Supreme Court made such a distinction in Trustees v.
Greenough,345 thereby avoiding an unnecessary full assessment of the
statute's scope. Thus early approval of the fund fee-shifting principle
may properly be said to have involved "construction" of the fee-bill
statute in the sense that courts rather easily surmised that the statute
had no relevance in the fund fee-shifting situation.
However, the Alyeska Pipeline Court's reading of the federal fee
statutes and their "construction" fails to explain adequately numer-
ous statements in past Supreme Court opinions acknowledging the
broad powers of federal courts to award attorney's fees "as between
party and party." Only last year the Court stated:
The federal judiciary has long recognized several exceptions to the
general principle that each party should bear the cost of its own
representation. We have long recognized that attorneys' fees may
be awarded to a successful party when his opponent has acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons .... 346
Throughout this century, the Supreme Court has often reiterated that
federal courts possess the power to award attorney's fees when equi-
table considerations demand such a result.347 Such statements do not
stand for the proposition, endorsed by the Alyeska Pipeline Court,
-5 105 U.S. 527 (1882). See notes 128-30 supra and accompanying text. The Greenough
Court, after reviewing English case law, considered the 1853 fee-bill statute:
The fee-bill is intended to regulate only those fees and costs which are strictly
chargeable as between party and party, and not to regulate the fees of counsel and
other expenses and charges as between solicitor and client, nor the power of a court
of equity, in cases of administration of funds under its control, to make such allow-
ance to the parties out of the fund as justice and equity may require. The fee-bill
itself expressly provides that it shall not be construed to prohibit attorneys. . . from
charging to and receiving from their clients . . . such reasonable compensation for
their services, in addition to the taxable costs, as may be in accordance with general
usage in their respective States, or may be agreed upon between the parties.
105 U.S. at 535. The Court concluded: "[Tlhe act contains nothing which can be fairly con-
strued to deprive the Court of Chancery of its long-established control over the costs and
charges of the litigation, to be exercised as equity and justice may require, including proper
allowances to those who have instituted proceedings for the benefit of a general fund." Id. at
536 (emphasis added).
M F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co,, 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974).
", See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375, 391-92 (1970); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref.
Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166-67 (1939);
Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1, 9 (1930); Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S.
300, 318 (1920).
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that Congress has, through the federal fee statutes, forbidden extras-
tatutory fee-shifting.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the inherent
federal court equity power to shift fees remains unimpeded by any
general348 congressional enactment. Indeed, even in Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 311 the Court stated that the-
no-fee rule is a creation of the judiciary30 and characterized §
1923(a) as an exception to the rule.35 Furthermore, in no other fee-
shifting decision of the Supreme Court during the past decade5 2 has
reference been made to the federal fee statutes. A mere two years ago,
in Hall v. Cole,53 the Court recognized that "even where 'fee-
shifting' would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the
power to circumscribe such relief." '354 Yet the Court in that case
affirmed a fee award not expressly authorized by a statute without
mentioning § 1920 or § 1923(a).
Because those two decisions unquestionably went beyond the fee-
shifting rationales of the older case law,355 it is especially noteworthy
that the federal fee statutes were cited in neither Hall v. Cole nor
Mills. The Alyeska Pipeline Court insisted that all proper federal
court fee-shifting had been in accord with the contemplation of Con-
gress as evidenced by specific grants of fee-shifting authority and by
the correct construction of the federal fee statutes. 6 Yet the Court
in Mills, though certainly breaking new ground with respect to fee
awards in the absence of express statutory empowerment, gave no
indication that it considered itself engaged in "construction" of the
federal fee statutes. 5' And, unlike the Alyeska Pipeline Court, the
31 The Supreme Court has held that fee-shifting is not proper with respect to a statutory
cause of action for which Congress has prescribed "intricate" and "meticulously detailed"
remedies. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); cf F.
D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
ug 386 U.S. 714 (1967). See notes 176-88 supra and accompanying text.
25 386 U.S. at 717-18.
't Id. at 718 n. 11.
3 2 F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974);
Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400(1968).(6 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
' Id. at 9.
a See notes 145-59, 191-200 supra and accompanying text. Compare Comment, The
Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. Rev. 316
(1971), with Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 849, 881-900 (1975). See also id. at 907-15.
358 95 S. Ct. at 1621-23.
' See generally Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-97 (1970).
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Hall Court did not recognize that Congress had curtailed the federal
courts' equitable fee-shifting powers:
Although the traditional American rule ordinarily disfavors the al-
lowance of attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory or contractual
authorization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable pow-
ers, may award attorneys' fees when the interests of justice so
require. Indeed, the power to award such fees "is part of the original
authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation,"
* * . and the federal courts do not hesitate to exercise this inherent
equitable power whenever "overriding considerations indicate the
need for such a recovery. 358
The Alyeska Pipeline Court's reading of the federal fee statutes
obviously does not comport with the broad descriptions of federal
court fee-shifting power which have repeatedly appeared in modern
Supreme Court decisions. Although it has been held that equitable
fee-shifting is precluded where Congress manifests an intent that judi-
cial discretion not be exercised, 5' no recent decision prior to Alyeska
Pipeline has even suggested that the federal fee statutes limit the
scope of equitable fee-shifting power.38 Nevertheless, the Alyeska
Pipeline Court, without paying more than passing attention to any
15 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973), quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S.
161, 166 (1939); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970).
' See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
The commentators have largely asserted that the federal courts' inherent equitable
power over attorney's fees has not been abated. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 354, at 899-900;
King and Plater, supra note 32, at 39-40; Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 313-14; Comment, Court
A warded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 645 (1974);
Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORN. L.
REv. 1222, 1229-30 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorney's Fees to the "Private Attorney Gen-
eral": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733, 735
(1973); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216,
1226-27 (1967).
Moreover, it is clear that the ever-increasing number of federal jurists who accepted the
private attorney general doctrine as a valid ground for fee awards in the absence of express
statutory authorization did not perceive any blanket restrictions on federal equitable fee-
shifting discretion. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Bond v. White,
508 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1986 (1975); Fowler v. Schwartzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th
Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975); Brandenburger v.
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973);
Yelverton v. Driggers, 370 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F.
Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd,
502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949 (D. Haw. 1972); Jinks v. Mays,
350 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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judicial decision rendered within the past 100 years, determined that
the award of attorney's fees in the federal courts is entirely a matter
of statute. In holding that federal court fee-shifting discretion is avail-
able only where authorized by express enactment or by construction
of the federal fee statutes, the Court embraced "an extremely narrow
view of the independent power of the courts in this area ....
2. Finding That Congress Has Not Extended to the Federal Courts
the Discretion to Make Private Attorney General Fee Awards in the
Absence of Express Statutory Authorization
The significance of the initial prong of the Supreme Court's
Alyeska Pipeline decision is clear. There has never been any doubt
that Congress is capable of limiting federal court fee-shifting discre-
tion." ' But under the view that there has been no wholesale congres-
sional circumscription of judicial fee-shifting power, the propriety of
a fee award in a given situation is primarily a matter of sound equita-
ble discretion. Of course, even in the absence of a general restriction
on equitable fee-shifting, Congress might foreclose judicial fee award
discretion with respect to particular circumstances or categories of
legal disputes.3 However, since "implied restrictions on the power
to do equity are disfavored,"3 4 federal courts would, under this view,
retain full discretionary power to award attorney's fees save that
which had been taken quite clearly from the judiciary. On the other
hand, the Alyeska Pipeline Court interpretation of the scope of the
federal fee statutes results in a different test for the permissibility of
discretionary fee-shifting: the touchstone is whether Congress has
allowed the courts to retain their discretionary powers in a given area
and not whether that power has been unambiguously withdrawn.
Thus the Alyeska Pipeline Court proceeded to explore whether
3" 95 S. Ct. at 1629 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall summarized the first
portion of the Court's opinion thusly:
In sum, the Court's primary contention-that Congress enjoys hegemony over
fee-shifting because of the docketing fee statute and occasional express provisions
for Attorneys' fees-will not withstand even the most casual reading of the preced-
ents. The Court's recognition of the several judge-made exceptions to the American
Rule demonstrates the inadequacy of its analysis. . . . I think that it is a serious
misstep for it to abdicate equitable authority in this area in the name of statutory
construction.
Id. at 1632.
31 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
10 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
3" 95 S. Ct. at 1632 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944).
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Congress intended the federal judiciary to wield the discretionary
power to make fee awards to private attorneys general in the absence
of express statutory authorization. Because of its initial determina-
tion that the no-fee rule is a creature of congressional design, the
Court needed to expend little additional effort in construing the fed-
eral fee statutes to deprive the federal courts of that power.
The Court first explained that Congress had not stripped the
federal judiciary of the discretion to shift fees in fund and bad faith
situations.35 The Court then added that this view had been vindi-
cated: "Congress has not repudiated the judicially fashioned excep-
tions to the general rule against allowing substantial attorney fees;
but neither has it retracted, repealed or modified the limitations on
taxable fees contained in the 1853 statute and its successors." 316 If
recitation of these factors was intended to offer a compelling basis
for differentiating between the private attorney general doctrine and
the older judicial grounds for fee-shifting, it is wide of the mark. Even
accepting the Alyeska Pipeline Court's basic interpretation of the
federal fee statutes, one might respond: Congress has not repudiated
the judicially fashioned private attorney general doctrine despite its
use by a substantial number of federal courts as a basis for shifting
fees in the absence of express statutory authorization; but neither did
it retract, repeal or modify the limitations on taxable fees contained
in the 1853 statute and its successors despite the failure of the federal
courts to begin implementing the traditional exceptions until several
decades after the statute was enacted.
The Court also pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 2412367 as an indication
that Congress did not intend that federal courts undertake private
attorney general fee-shifting without explicit statutory permission.
Because § 2412 generally immunizes the federal government and its
officials from attorney's fees awards, the Court reasoned that the
statute is inconsistent with the existence of any broad federal court
power to shift the fees of a party who serves the public interest,
especially since private attorneys general are often involved in litiga-
tion against federal agencies or officials.66 The Court further noted
ml 95 S. Ct. at 1622.
Ms Id. at 1623.
- 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his
official capacity . . ..
" 95 S. Ct. at 1626.
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that some federal statutes expressly render federal government defen-
dants amenable to fee award liability. " ' Although it appears that §
2412 does insulate federal government defendants from assessment of
fee awards in the absence of an overriding statute,370 this factor does
not eviscerate the private attorney general doctrine. Fee-shifting
would still be available for private attorneys general who redress the
wrongs of private defendants.3 1 Furthermore, it is not unusual for
the law to differentiate between public and private defendants with
respect to liability.
The foremost determinant of the Alyeska Pipeline Court's deci-
sion that private attorney general fee-shifting is not unavailable ab-
sent express statutory authorization was the Court's assessment of
the import of congressional fee-shifting. Since Congress has created
specific statutory grants of fee-shifting authority, the Court found
that Congress had not "extended any roving authority to the Judici-
ary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever the courts
might deem them warranted. 32 This conclusion was buttressed,
reasoned the Court, by the fact that the various federal statutes which
expressly provide for fee awards contain different standards, some
permissive, some mandatory, for the use of fee-shifting. 73
Although the Court acknowledged that the private attorney gen-
eral concept underlay many of the express fee-shifting provisions
enacted by Congress,374 this circumstance was not deemed to consti-
tute legislative permission for the judiciary to apply the doctrine on
its own initiative. On the contrary, Congress' recognition and use of
the private attorney general concept was viewed by the Court as an
indication that only legislators have the acumen to determine when
the public interest might be sufficiently enhanced by litigation to
warrant the possibility of fee-shifting as an inducement for private
legal action. The Alyeska Pipeline Court therefore said:
[C]ongressional utilization of the private attorney general concept
can in no sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary
361 Id. at 1626-27, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
11 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1974). But see 95 S. Ct.
at 1634 n. 9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' It was never conclusively determined whether federal courts could, in the absence of
statute, shift fees against state agencies and entities and their officials. Compare Sims v. Amos,
340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), with Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899
(6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1985 (1975). The matter was not at issue in
Alyeska Pipeline. 95 S. Ct. at 1627-28 n.44.
37 Id. at 1623.
' Id. at 1623-24.
' Id. at 1624.
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to jettison the traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to
the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees whenever the
courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute im-
portant enough to warrant the award.
Congress itself presumably has the power and judgment to pick
and choose among its statutes and to allow attorneys' fees under
some but not others. But it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts
without legislative guidance to consider some statutes important
and others unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connec-
tion with the former.375
Thus the Alyeska Pipeline Court found that selective congres-
sional provision for fee-shifting evidences that Congress has system-
atically considered the proper and desirable incidence of fee awards
in the federal courts. Congressional activity in this area was therefore
believed to be incompatible with the existence of any broad private
attorney general fee-shifting power in the federal judiciary. The deter-
mination whether a litigant enforcing a particular substantive provi-
sion might function as a private attorney general was labelled "a
policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself.'3 7 Hence the
Alyeska Pipeline Court concluded:
"Since the approach taken by Congress has been to carve out spe-
cific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts cannot award
attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1923, those courts
are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allow-
ance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation
or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which
they sue and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depend-
ing upon the courts' assessment of the importance of the public
policies involved in particular cases."'
The Alyeska Pipeline Court's disposition of the private attorney
general doctrine is reminiscent of the stance earlier adopted by the
Fourth Circuit. An expected Supreme Court decision7 ' on the valid-
ity of fee awards to private attorneys general in the absence of express
statutory authorization was averted last year when the Court found
a statutory ground for fee-shifting in Bradley v. School Board 79
Bradley was a school desegregation case in which the federal district
court had awarded attorney's fees to the successful plaintiffs .3  The
"I Id. at 1624-25.
"I Id. at 1627.
3n Id.
See King and Plater, supra note 32, at 54-55.
416 U.S. 696 (1974).
Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.
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trial court's decree rested on the dual bases that the defendant had
acted in bad faith and that the plaintiffs had served as private attor-
neys general. The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's fee-
shifting decision, finding no bad faith and disapproving the use of the
private attorney general doctrine as a basis for fee awards.381 The
Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded
the case to the trial court. However, the Court's decision in that case
rested solely upon the application of § 718 of the Emergency School
Aid Act,8 ' which authorizes fee-shifting in school desegregation liti-
gation. 83
In voicing its opposition to private attorney general fee-shifting
in the absence of express congressional authorization, the Fourth
Circuit Bradley majority focused upon the doctrine's substitution of
judicial assessment of public interest value for unequivocal congres-
sional declaration of policy. Observing that "determining what is
public policy is an issue normally reserved for legislative determina-
tion," '384 the majority felt that judicial exploration of the public inter-
est value of cases in litigation is an unwarranted encroachment upon
congressional prerogative. The court stated that acceptance of the
judicial private attorney general doctrine "will launch courts upon the
difficult and complex task of determining what is public policy,...
and, even more difficult, which public policy warrants the encourage-
ment of award of fees to attorneys for private litigants who voluntar-
ily take upon themselves the character of private attorneys-
general." 3 5 Such a task was believed to be exclusively within the
province of the legislative branch.
The view-first suggested in Bradley and now incorporated in
the Supreme Court's Alyeska Pipeline holding-that the judicial pri-
vate attorney general doctrine is not consonant with the contempora-
neous congressional possession and exercise of private attorney gen-
eral fee-shifting power appears to be deficient in several respects.
First, it assumes that Congress possesses, and attributes to itself, the
1972), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
" 472 F.2d at 328-29.
M82 0 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. 1974).
13" Section 718 provides for discretionary fee-shifting. The Supreme Court had pre-
viously held that successful § 718 plaintiffs should receive fee awards in the absence of "special
circumstances which would render such an award unjust." Northeross v. Board of Educ., 412
U.S. 427, 428 (1973). In remanding Bradley, the Court held that § 718 could be applied to
counsel fees incurred by the plaintiffs prior to the statute's enactment.
I" Bradley v. School Bd,, 472 F.2d 318, 329 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 416
U.S. 696 (1974).
u Id.
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prescience to anticipate and make provision for all situations in which
the issue of fee-shifting might properly arise. Of course, Congress has
neither the time nor the ability to foresee and enact legislation which
covers in detail each of the varied factual situations which come
before the federal courts. 8  Congress functions ponderously and
must usually draft broad rules of general applicability. 387 Thus Sena-
tor Tunney has suggested that congressional silence with respect to
fee-shifting "is merely a by-product of the legislative process and not
a conscious signal to the courts of any kind. ' 388
Second, while the legislature is ill-equipped to consider the myr-
iad details of real life disputes, it is precisely the duty of the courts
to do so. The federal courts are charged with the continuing task of
gauging and counterbalancing the competing equities of disputants.
Exploration of the public interest is often an important element of
the adjudicative process. Indeed Congress has recognized the unique
facility of the judiciary for determining the ultimate propriety of fee-
shifting in particular cases by enacting statutes providing for permis-
sive fee awards.389
Finally, private attorney general fee-shifting is only a further
instance of the federal courts' established practice of furnishing ap-
propriate mechanisms to assure the vindication of protected rights.
The Supreme Court has been willing to "imply" remedies necessary
for the effectuation of important substantive rights: "Thus, in suits
for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any ex-
press authorization of a damage remedy, this court has authorized
3" Indeed, Bradley is a prime example of Congress' inability to speedily recognize and
provide for all situations in which private attorney general fee awards are desirable. The
Emergency School Aid Act, which contained the fee-shifting provision the Supreme Court held
to be applicable to the Bradley litigation, was not enacted until two years after that litigation
had been started. See Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
s Therefore, it seems plausible that congressional silence with respect to fee-shifting
should be attributed scant weight in the absence of some overt congressional disapproval of
fee awards. However, if it is assumed that congressional silence is significant, is it not reasona-
ble to conclude that Congress, in failing to enact (or amend) statutes with express language
proscribing fee-shifting, contemplates full use of the federal courts' equitable power to award
attorney's fees? As Mr. Justic Stewart stated in his Fleischmann dissent:
The argument that Congress has declined to amend the Act to provide explicitly for
counsel fees is hardly determinative. For Congress can be assumed to have known
that the federal courts were consistently exercising the power to award counsel fees
after the Act's passage. The failure to amend the statute to do away with this judicial
power. . . speaks loudly for its recognition . . . .
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 723 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
11 Tunney, supra note 254, at 633.
"' See statutes cited in notes 94, 95 & 96 supra.
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such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the
congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the
statute." 390 A distinction may be drawn between enabling vindication
of legal rights by implying a damage remedy and encouraging vindi-
cation through the award of attorney's fees."' However, this distinc-
tion pales under close scrutiny. In either case, a court must investi-
gate the policy which underlies a substantive provision, assess the
importance of that policy and determine what assortment of judicial
powers may properly be invoked to ensure implementation of that
policy. 92
The A lyeska Pipeline Court's reading of the federal fee statutes
to embody and formalize the no-fee rule substantially impaired the
likelihood that the Court would uphold the use of private attorney
general fee-shifting in the absence of explicit legislative permission.
Yet the Court might still have concluded that Congress had intended
for the federal courts to retain and exercise the full measure of their
inherent equitable power to control costs in litigation of matters
suffused with great public interest value. The enactment of statutes
providing for fee awards to private attorneys general might have been
seen as legislative signals to the federal courts indicating, by non-
exclusive example, the areas of public policy which are sufficiently
momentous to warrant judicial fee-shifting. Further support for this
"construction" of the federal fee statutes might then have been drawn
from the absence of overt and adverse congressional response to the
accelerating usage of the judicial private attorney general doctrine.
Instead, by holding that the incidence of private attorney general fee-
shifting is "a policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself," the
Alyeska Pipeline Court resurrected and fortified the no-fee barrier to
public interest litigation which many lower federal courts have at-
tempted diligently to dissipate.
390 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring), citing J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Engineermen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). See generally Note, The Phenomenon of Im-
plied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legis-
lation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 441-50 (1974).
311 See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 636, 671 (1974).
311 See Bond v. White, 508 F.2d 1397 (1975). The court held that plaintiffs who had
successfully prosecuted a private action enforcing § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1970), were entitled to a private attorney general doctrine fee award. Referring
to Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), in which the Supreme Court implied a
private § 5 right of action, the Fifth Circuit stated: "The considerations that the Supreme Court
relied upon to imply a private right of action in Allen are also relevant in determining the
propriety of an award of attorneys' fees under the private attorneys general exception." Bond
v. White, 508 F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. 1975).
COMMENT
CONCLUSION
The no-fee rule is a deeply entrenched constituent of the Ameri-
can legal system. Yet the circumstances which apparently led to
adoption of the no-fee rule in the United States have long since
receeded into history. The persistence of the traditional allocation of
attorney's fees among American litigants can be ascribed more to
inattention and inertia than to reasoned analysis of the rule's merits:
Often taken for a maxim graven in stone, the American [no-
fee] Rule may not only be an historical legislative accident, but may
as well owe its continued existence to a fundamental error in the
judicial process. For judicial preoccupation with stare decisis, not
judicial acceptance of the Rule itself, is primarily responsible for the
present American Rule of attorney's fees.393
Although the federal courts have long acknowledged that they
possess the power to award attorney's fees as costs in appropriate
situations, the judiciary has severly limited its exercise of that power
until the last decade. In the face of mounting criticism of the no-fee
rule, the federal judiciary in recent years began to appreciate more
fully the potential usefulness of the power to control taxable costs as
a method of litigation decisions. In doing so, and in thereby extending
their use of fee-shifting power, the federal courts mitigated some of
the detrimental effects of the no-fee rule.
The expansion of the bad faith and fund exceptions to the no-
fee rule and the ensuring development of the private attorney general
fee-shifting doctrine warranted enthusiastic reaction.", By imple-
menting these new fee-shifting theories, the federal courts took a
commendable step toward freer access to the judicial system for those
wishing to press claims of great public importance. Moreover, these
fee-shifting developments were consistent with other recent instances
"I Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 636, 642 (1974).
"I In addition to its acceptance by an ever-increasing number of federal courts, the
private attorney general exception to the no-fee rule has received generally favorable treatment
by commentators. See Falcon, supra note 233, at 407-20; King and Plater, supra note 32, at
48-57, 62-77; Nussbaum, supra note 67; Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in
Environmental Litigation, 58 CORN. L. REv. 1222, 1237-46 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorneys'
Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public
Interest, 24 HAST. L.J. 733 (1973). See also Comment, Balancing the Equities in Attorney's
Fees Awards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62 GEO. L.J. 1439 (1974); Comment,
Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 655-
81 (1974); Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Litigation Where the Action Is
Not Based on a Statute Providing For an Award of Attorney Fees, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 405
(1973).
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of judicial activism, and they substantially coincided with enhanced
congressional recognition of the salutary uses of fee awards. 3 15 The
private attorney general doctrine could have been a most efficacious
tool for stimulating protection of the public interest by private liti-
gants.
In the Alyeska Pipeline case the Supreme Court has again taken
a "stunning step backward." The Court has now declared that federal
courts do not, after all, possess broad discretionary equitable power
to award attorney's fees. Furthermore, the Court stated that the
federal courts were stripped of this power more than a century ago.
This view is almost certainly irreconcilable with the tenor of Supreme
Court decisions in numerous cases of the past several decades-cases
which the Alyeska Pipeline Court did not see fit to discuss. The
private attorney general analysis may continue to prove useful in
cases involving statutes which authorize discretionary awards of at-
torney's fees.39 But the Alyeska Pipeline holding forbids further
judicial encouragement of public interest litigation through fee-
shifting without explicit congressional sanction. 97 It is imperative
that Congress respond to the restrictiveness of the Court's decision.
However, even if private attorney general fee-shifting was legis-
latively made available to the federal courts on a widespread basis,
the doctrine would not seem to pose a serious threat of swallowing
"I One court, in awarding attorney's fees to a successful § 1983 plaintiff, noted the general
increase in explicit congressional authorization of fee-shifting without making reference to any
particular legislation:
IT]his court feels that in equitable suits to remedy violations of fourth amendment
rights of those not suspected of criminal activity, an award of attorney's fees as costs
is within the court's power and responsibility. Where as here fee shifting is necessary
to insure the vindication of important constitutional rights and appropriate because
of the inadequate remedies otherwise available, because it is consistent with a remedy
increasingly furnished by Congress, and because of the high social value placed upon
the rights involved, an award of attorney's fees as costs is essential, lest these impor-
tant rights be relegated to a mere platitude.
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (footnote omitted; emphasis
added).
"' See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973).
"I Of course, some of the lower federal court private attorney general fee-shifting cases
involved situations wherein fee awards could have been based on more traditional grounds. See,
e.g., Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 409 U.S. 942
(1972). In addition, lower federal courts may in the future invoke expanded versions of the
traditional exceptions to the no-fee rule. For articulation of a broadened bad faith test, see Cato
v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Ark.), af'd, 403 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1968). For a "quasi-
application" of the fund fee-shifting principle, see Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
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the no-fee rule and thus would not represent a panacea for the rule's
alleged inequities. Therefore, the judicial activism demonstrated in
lower federal court fee-shifting decisions of the past several years and
the sudden cessation of that trend by A lyeska Pipeline must not serve
to obscure the desirability of taking a fresh look at the allocation of
litigants' counsel fees. Instead, these recent developments should ac-
centuate the need for a thoroughgoing examination of the role that
the allocation of attorney's fees plays in litigation and potential liti-
gant decision-making and, ultimately, in the quality of American
justice. The exigency of such an inquiry, to be followed by whatever
legislative action may be appropriate, should inspire concern by all
members of the legal profession. 9 8
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" Cf ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 2.
